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Quantitative Safety Assessments (QSA) are essential to safety benefit verifications and 
regulations of developmental changes in safety critical systems like the Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) systems. Effectiveness of the assessments is particularly desirable today in 
the safe implementation of revolutionary ATC overhauls like NextGen and SESAR. QSA of 
ATC systems are however challenged by system complexity and lack of accident data. 
Extending from the idea “safety is a control problem” in the literature, this research 
proposes to assess system safety from the control perspective, through quantifying a 
system’s “control capacity”. A system’s safety performance correlates to this “control 
capacity” in the control of “safety critical processes”. To examine this idea in QSA of the 
ATC systems, a Control-capacity Based Safety Assessment Framework (CBSAF) is 
developed which includes two control capacity metrics and a procedural method. The 
two metrics are Probabilistic System Control-capacity (PSC) and Temporal System 
Control-capacity (TSC); each addresses an aspect of a system’s control capacity. And the 




processes, II) development of system control models and III) evaluation of system 
control capacity.  
The CBSAF was tested in two case studies. The first one assesses an en-route collision 
avoidance scenario and compares three hypothetical configurations. The CBSAF was 
able to capture the uncoordinated behavior between two means of control, as was 
observed in a historic midair collision accident. The second case study compares CBSAF 
with an existing risk based QSA method in assessing the safety benefits of introducing a 
runway incursion alert system. Similar conclusions are reached between the two 
methods, while the CBSAF has the advantage of simplicity and provides a new control-
based perspective and interpretation to the assessments. 
The case studies are intended to investigate the potential and demonstrate the utilities 
of CBSAF and are not intended for thorough studies of collision avoidance and runway 
incursions safety, which are extremely challenging problems. Further development and 
thorough validations are required to allow CBSAF to reach implementation phases, e.g. 







CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
Safety assessment is the evaluation or estimation of the nature, quality, or ability of a 
system to maintain accident free operations. Safety assessments of safety critical 
systems such as the Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems paradoxically are extremely 
difficult, due to their complexity. Several researchers have proposed that viewing safety 
in these systems as a problem of control can be helpful. This research builds on that 
work, with the development of a concept of “control capacity”. 
1.1 Assess system safety from the control perspective 
Safety assessments identify a system’s vulnerabilities, termed hazards, its tolerance of 
hazards, as well as possible counter measures to handle hazards, in the presence of 
system disturbance, disruptions and degradation (Safe Work Australia, 2012). 
The counter-hazard measures or safety measures can be viewed as safety controls, 
which maintain the system in a safe state, or return it to a safe state. Several 
researchers have taken this view, most notably Leveson, whose STAMP accident model 
is based on the idea that accidents happen when one or more of the control means to 
prevent or mitigate hazards is inadequate in some way (Leveson 2004).  
Intuitively, it is clear that some systems are safer than others. It then follows that if 




different systems’ safety performance and thus act as an indicator of each system’s 
safety. I therefore propose “control capacity” as one potential way of assessing a 
system’s safety. Most research taking the control approaches to safety has focused on 
using the concept to understand why accidents happen, or to guide design decisions, 
which are qualitative. In this research, I propose quantitatively assessing system safety 
from the control perspective via the quantification of this “control capacity”. 
1.2 Need for Quantitative Safety Assessments in ATC 
The second motivation for this research is the need for comprehensive Quantitative 
Safety Assessment (QSA) methods in ATC systems. To address increasing traffic 
demands and aging infrastructures, air transportation systems around the world are 
undergoing revolutionary overhauls, represented by the Next Generation Air 
Transportation Systems (NextGen) and the Single European Single ATM (Air Traffic 
Management) Research (SESAR) (FAA, 2011, SESAR 2012, Brooker, 2008). NextGen for 
example will “redesign airspace and deploy new performance-based flight procedures, 
develop systems to help controllers better manage air traffic, and provide critical 
technologies and infrastructure for NextGen” (Scovel III and General, 2013). 
Implementation challenges of NextGen in the latest government reports share the 
themes of undefined benefits of NextGen and consequently ATC users’ reluctance to 
invest on and adopt new components and procedures (Scovel III and General, 2013). 
To verify and assess safety benefits of the new components or concepts of operations 
introduced to a system, all safety assessment approaches follow an underlying safety 




1-1, the expected level of safety must be determined, e.g. through modeling, prediction 
and validation. Only if the safety levels are not compromised when comparing the 
expected level of safety to a target level of safety, can the changes be approved. An 
essential part of making the comparison is to express and assess safety quantitatively, 
and thus quantitative safety assessments. 
 
Figure 1-1 Safety Check of ATC Change adapted from (Brooker, 2002a) 
1.2.1 Challenges faced by Quantitative Safety Assessment in ATC 
Quantitative safety assessment in safety critical systems like the ATC system is 
extremely difficult. Two major challenges of making meaningful and credible 
quantitative assessments are 1) system complexity and 2) lack of accident data. 
System complexity: The ATC system is a large scale, geographically distributed, and 
socio-technical system. It is extremely difficult to directly simulate the system’s 
dynamics, or to accurately predict its future behaviors. To assure safety, safety critical 
systems in particular often have multiple redundant controls, which further increase the 




components and automated systems. While such integration leverages the advantages 
of human and automation, it is a major source of uncertainty and further renders 
system’s behaviors unpredictable (Wickens, 1998). 
Lack of accident data: safety critical systems are engineered to be extremely safe. Air 
transportation in the United States currently has  safety level of about 1 disastrous 
aircraft accident per 107 flight hours (≈1140 years) (Savage, 2013). The risk of a mid-air 
collision is estimated at 10−7~10−12  per flight hour (Knecht, 1997, Blom et al., 2001).  
Due to the rarity of air traffic accidents, to measure safety with statistical metrics as 
such, accident data needs to be collected over long periods of time. It does not tell if the 
system “now is safe, or if it is getting safer or less safe” (Brooker, 2007).  
An alternative approach is to use incident data. The issue with incident data is its 
incompleteness due to many complication factors in the reporting of incidents (Reynard, 
1986, Shorrock, 2005, Shorrock, 2007). For a more comprehensive survey of current 
safety metrics using incident data, see (Brooker, 2007).  
Current QSA approaches are predominantly risk based. To assess a risk level of 10−7~10−12 per flight hour for the ATC systems, many risk based QSA approaches are 
greatly challenged. The retrospective, data driven approaches must rely on very limited 
accident data that are collected over long durations, which are subject to significant 
fluctuations with occurrence of a single accident event among other drawbacks (Brook 
2007). The prospective, simulation based approaches are faced with two major hurdles, 




uncertainties, and 2) very long simulation hours since one accident is expected to occur 
every millions of (simulated) flight hours (Blom et al., 2001).  
The challenges to quantitatively assess the immediate safety performance of the ATC 
systems are not trivial; it requires years of data collection, exploration of many possible 
methods, and continuous validation and verification practices. The purpose of the 
proposal to use “control capacity” as a safety metric is a small yet necessary step 
towards exploring alternative safety metrics; it extends and builds upon the previous 
efforts to correlate system safety with system control. As is suggested by (Mannan, 
2012), a diversity of metrics should be used to comprehensively describe the system’s 
safety performance. A system’s “Control capacity” is a relevant, but rarely explored 
addition to the current safety metric repository.  
1.3 Research objectives and Scope 
To reiterate the above discussions, the intended research objectives and questions are 
summarized in Table 1-1. The first research objective seeks formal definition of system 
control capacity, and establishment of its correlation to a system’s safety performance. 
The second objective examines the viability of system control capacity in quantitative 
safety assessments of ATC systems. The intermediate research questions leading to the 






Table 1-1: Research Objectives and Research Questions 
Number Objectives and Research Questions 
Objective 1 Correlate Control Capacity to System Safety Performance 
 Q1: What is system control capacity? 
Q2: How does system control relate to system safety? 
Q3: How does system control capacity relate to system safety 
performance? 
Objective 2 Examine Viability of Control Capacity as Safety Performance Metric in 
Quantitative Safety Assessment of ATC 
 Q1: How can system control capacity be quantified? 
Q2: How can the quantification of control capacity used for quantitative 
safety assessments? 
Q3: What are the implementation challenges using control capacity in 
ATC quantitative safety assessment? 
Q4: Can results of system control capacity based safety assessment be 
trusted? 
 
1.4 Organization  
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: CHAPTER 2 reviews previous 
research on ATC system accident prevention and safety assessment. CHAPTER 3 seeks 
formal definitions of system control capacity and details theoretic basis to use control 
capacity as a safety measure. CHAPTER 4 introduces two metrics for system control 
capacity: Probabilistic System Control Capacity (PSC) and Temporal System Control 
Capacity (TSC). CHAPTER 5 elaborates on the theoretic framework needed for 
quantitative safety assessments using the two proposed control capacity metrics. 
CHAPTER 6 demonstrates the use of the theoretic framework in a case of en route 




method in assessing safety benefits of a runway incursion alert system. CHAPTER 8 
concludes the findings in the two case studies and about the method, and proposes 





CHAPTER 2. SAFETY ASSESSMENTS OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS 
This chapter reviews researches and practices relevant to quantitative safety 
assessments of ATC systems. First, definitions and scopes of ATC accidents and safety 
concerns are reviewed. To assure safety, the previous and current approaches are 
categorized and summarized. As means to assess the effectiveness of safety assurances, 
both qualitative and quantitative assessment methods are then discussed.  Qualitative 
safety assessments identify system hazards, which is often a prerequisite or a 
component for quantitative safety assessments. For quantitative safety assessments, 
the focus is on existing safety metrics. Finally, a brief review on the control related 
safety metrics is provided.  
2.1 ATC accidents 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Safety and Accidents: Qualitatively, safety is the absence of accidents (Leveson, 2011). 
Accidents are events characterized by 1) loss or injury and 2) unknown times of 
occurrence. In different contexts, the former characteristic requires further specification, 
which can be arbitrary. For instance, the amount of loss that distinguishes “incidents” 
from “accidents” in aviation is specified by the International Civil Aviation Organization 




Aviation accidents: In safety critical systems, accidents are often associated with 
disastrous consequences, e.g. loss of lives. The International Civil Aviation Annex 13 
defines an aviation accident as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an 
aircraft, which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the 
intention of flight until all such persons have disembarked, where a person is fatally or 
seriously injured, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure or the aircraft is 
missing or is completely inaccessible” (Site, 1994). This definition specifies the general 
category of aviation accidents, as well as the severity of loss for an aviation mishap to be 
counted as an accident.  
ATC accidents: Not all aviation accidents are ATC accidents; that is to say, not all 
aviation accidents are caused by ATC. For example, mid-air collisions and runway 
incursions are ATC accidents; structure failure and bird strike are not. 
The ATC system is “principally a matter of preventing collisions with other aircraft, 
obstructions, and the ground; assisting aircraft in avoiding hazardous weather; assuring 
that aircraft do not operate in airspace where operations are prohibited; and assisting 
aircraft in distress” (Varon, 2000, FAA, 2015). This summary draws the boundaries of 
ATC’s “circle of influence”, beyond which the ATC has no control over.  
2.1.2 Views of accidents 
Understanding why and how accidents occur is necessary for eliciting lessons from past 
accidents and for accumulating knowledge of engineering safer systems in the future. 
Accident models are mental constructs that help humans to make sense of accidents, 




Chain of events: The earliest and most popular accident model is the sequential events 
model, also known as the chain of events model. The chain of events model assumes 
that accidents occur as a results of series of hazardous events. 
The first event sequence accident model, the domino model, was introduced by 
Heinrich in 1932. As shown in Figure 2-1, the accident outcome i.e. “injury” is at the end 
of a series of events: 1) social environment (cultural tolerance or incentive to risk taking), 
2) fault of the person, 3) unsafe acts or conditions, 4) accident, and 5) injury.  
The event chain is analogous to a falling line of dominos, hence the name dominos. In 
accidents, the occurrence of the leading event causes the next event to occur, and 
eventually the accident event at the end of the chain. The model also represents 
Heinrich’s belief that accidents are rooted in the deeper and broader environmental 
contexts, e.g. the social environment (Mannan, 2012).  
 
Figure 2-1 Heinrich's Domino accident model - a chain of events 
Swiss cheese model (Reason, 2000): A Swiss cheese model moves towards a system 
view that an accident is not simply a collection of mistakes, but inherent to the system 
structures and conditions within which it operates. The Swiss cheese model abstracts a 
system as layers of safeguards, analogous to Swiss cheese slices superimposed on each 
other. Each layer will have defects, like the holes on a Swiss cheese slice. Unlike actual 




Accidents happen when "holes" in the safeguards line up to allow an accident trajectory 
to penetrate through. Figure 2-2 is an illustration of the Swiss Cheese accident model 
adapted from (Reason, 2000) and (Maurino et al., 1995) 
 
Figure 2-2 Swiss Cheese Model adapted from (Maurino et al., 1995) 
If the chain of events interprets operation process of the system, then the Swiss cheese 
model focuses on explaining the system's role in accident occurrences and prevention. 
Instead of containing error events in the event chain leading to an accident, 
countermeasures derived from the Swiss cheese model center around making changes 
to operational conditions and system configurations, and strengthening defenses 
against accidents. 
System-Theoretic Models (Rasmussen, 1997, Leveson, 2004): With the increase of 
complexity in modern engineering systems, e.g. socio-technical systems, sophisticated 
safety models are needed to represent and interpret the complex system dynamics that 
produce accidents. Stroeve et al. argue that accidents can be considered as an 




Rasmussen first promoted a “top-down” rather than “bottom up”, and a “functional 
abstraction” rather than “structure decomposition” approach to model accident 
causation. Rasmussen argues that risk management and accident prevention should be 
considered a control problem; it is a cross-disciplinary subject and requires all levels of 
society to be involved in this control process including legislators, managers, and 
operators (Rasmussen, 1997). A sketch of Rasmussen’s hierarchical system model is 
illustrated in Figure 2-3. In this model, the upper levels in the hierarchy have higher 
authority in decision making than lower levels and concern more strategic and long term 
goals, as opposed to tactical and short term ones, for the system. The decisions, in 
terms of policies, regulations, and judgments made at the upper levels, are passed down, 
concretized and actualized at the lower levels. Information on the effects of these 
decisions is continuously observed and reported back to the upper levels, in the form of 
data, reports, and reviews, which are then integrated to the upper levels to support 





Figure 2-3 The hierarchical system model adapted from (Rasmussen, 1997) 
The System Theoretic Accident Model and Process model, STAMP, introduced in 
(Leveson, 2004) by Leveson stresses the view of system safety as a control problem. 
STAMP includes details on the possible hazardous control actions, to which an accident 
can be traced.  
The STAMP based Process Analysis (STPA) gives further hazard identification principles 




occurrence is that accidents originate from the erroneous or ineffective interactions 
along the loop of control, and preventions of accident require enforcement of control 
constraints at each stage of control (Leveson, 2004, Leveson 2011).  
2.2 Safety Assurance in ATC 
2.2.1 Improvement of infrastructure and separation standards 
To control air traffic, ATC systems rely on Communication, Navigation and Surveillance 
(CNS) infrastructures to accurately track aircraft positions, guide flights along their 
planned routes, and collaborate with pilots, during the course of flights (Varon, 2000, 
Nolan, 2010). Detailed descriptions of CNS equipment and evolution are given in (Nolan, 
2010). In the early days of ATC, uncertainties of aircraft positions using the primitive 
CNS systems are basis for the Reich model, which derived aircraft separation standards 
(Brooker, 2002a, Xu et al., 2008), and are still in use today. See Figure 2-4.  
 
Figure 2-4 Reich Model (Brooker, 2002a) 
ATC development tends to follow a bottom-up approach. Blom et al. pointed out that  
ATC/ATM improvement plans are organized around local features, e.g. improvements of 
the automation tools, the controllers/pilots and their human machine interfaces (HMIs), 




impact on system’s behavior, yet the enhancements of their particular functions do not 
guarantee system level safety performance improvements (Rasmussen, 1997).  
Since the development of Reich models, surveillance environment has improved 
significantly. The separation standards derived from Reich model no longer stand on the 
same assumptions. For example, the guidance and navigation technologies have been 
greatly advanced since then, and the uncertainty of an aircraft’s position has been 
significantly reduced. Figure 2-5 illustrates the change of contributions of aircraft 
position uncertainty to separation standards comparing ATC en route radar systems of 
1950s and the modern day.  
 
Figure 2-5 Aircraft Position Uncertainty Comparison (Hansman and Odoni, 2009) 
The new safety challenges of modern complex engineering system like the ATC are 
summarized in (Leveson, 2011), including rapid development of new technologies, 
changing nature of accidents, and increased complexity and coupling. In ATC, safety is a 
result of interactions between a variety of system elements including human operators, 
procedures, and technical systems all of which are highly distributed. Safety should 




2.2.2 Redundancy and Defense in Depth 
Redundancy is another common strategy for ATC safety assurance. Redundancy allows a 
reliable system to be built on “unreliable” components (Shrivastava et al., 2009). In ATC 
developments, new components are added to existing systems rather than replacing 
them. For example, primary radar was followed by secondary surveillance radar and 
variant “monopulse” radar (Brooker, 2008). This technique is also termed defense in 
depth, in that errors or occurrence of hazards will need to penetrate through layers of 
defenses to cause accidents. 
Defense in depth originated from military tactics (Bass 2001). Instead of defeating an 
attack with one strong defense line, the defense in depth technique use several (weaker) 
layers of defense to delay or reduce the effect of attack, before an counter attack action 
can be taken. Such technique is also seen in other industries such as the nuclear power 
plants.  
The use of redundancy and defense in depth result in a redundant, layered and complex 
system structure. Since ATC, like other safety critical systems, relies on the proper 
decisions of human operators/controllers, opaqueness due to system complexity will 
complicate the decision making process, and render system prone to human errors 
(Saleh and Bakolas, 2009). 
Additionally, interactions between the different means of control are not fully known or 
tested, owing to the scale, complexity and lack of experimental environments in ATC 




concept of system controllability and observability  borrowing concepts from the control 
theories and discrete event system theories (Saleh and Bakolas, 2009). 
2.3 Safety Assessment in ATC 
Safety assessments can be generalized into two categories, qualitative and quantitative. 
Qualitative safety assessment identifies the hazards and consequences of different 
failure modes, whereas quantitative safety assessments quantify the severity of the 
consequences and express the severity in terms of a predetermined safety metric such 
as risk. 
2.3.1 Qualitative Safety Assessment 
From studies of a variety of industrial safety issues, many hazard identification 
techniques are available both in practice and in research (Geisinger, 2003). Common 
approaches include Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), Common Cause Analysis (CCA), and HAZard and OPerability study 
(HAZOP). Some of these techniques have been tested and adopted in the air traffic 
control system safety assessments (Dunjó et al., 2010a, Becker et al., 1997).  
FMEA: Failure Model and Effect Analysis was one of the first systematic techniques for 
failure analysis and hazard identification. The method systematically postulates 
component failures and identifies the resultant effects on system operations, for as 
many components, assemblies and subsystems as possible. This process is based upon 
and recorded on specific FMEA worksheets. A successful FMEA needs to identify all 





Although widely used for systemic qualitative system assessments, FMEA is generally 
considered a basic approach that cannot identify complex scenarios that involve 
multiple failures (Shebl et al., 2009, Franklin et al., 2012). The method also lack validity 
when used in isolation, owing to scoping and organizational boundaries (Potts et al., 
2014). 
HAZOP: A HAZard and OPerability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic 
examination, usually by a multi-disciplinary team, of an operation process to identify 
and evaluate hazards arising from deviations in the process. Deviations are marked by 
guidewords (MORE OF, LESS OF, NONE, REVERSE, PART OF, AS WELL AS, OTHER THAN…), 
to the process variables or parameters (flow, pressure, temperature, level, 
composition…) that are important to the process safety.  
An example use of HAZOP is shown in Figure 2-6. The completeness of this hazard 
identification relies on team members’ “intuition and good judgement” and the “climate 
of positive thinking and frank discussion” at the meetings (Site, 1994). 
 




An example of HAZOP use in ATC is given in (Leadbetter et al., 2001), which applied the 
method to identify human error sources including the user interface and cognitive 
process. 
 The HAZOP approach has a focus on operational and managerial hazards, rather than 
mere component failures. It however, requires multidisciplinary expert knowledge, and 
depends on identification of system mode and deviation modes (guidewords) (Dunjó et 
al., 2010b). 
STPA: STAMP based Process Analysis (STPA) is a hazard identification method based on 
STAMP. From the operational control model in the STAMP hierarchy, STPA gives further 
guidelines on hazard identification in the “control” process (Leveson, 2004).  
A basic assumption of STPA on accident occurrence is that accidents originate from the 
erroneous or ineffective actions along the loop of control, and prevention of accident 
requires enforcement of control constraints at each stage of control. The STPA 
generalize three groups of hazards: 1) inadequate enforcement of constraints, 2) 
inadequate execution of control action, and 3) in adequate or missing feedback 
(Leveson, 2004). For a complete list of control hazard types, see (Leveson, 2004) and 
(Leveson, 2011).  
2.3.2 Quantitative Safety Assessment 
Quantitative safety assessments are important to system designers and policy makers; it 
can be particularly valuable at early stages of a system’s development to filter design 
concepts, on the safety ground (Blom et al., 2001).  System safety needs to expressed 





A variety of quantitative safety assessment methods can be found in literature (Netjasov, 
2010). Blom (2006) distinguishes static safety assessment techniques from dynamic 
ones. Static assessment methods are often combined with qualitative hazard 
identification methods and use of the hazard probabilities. Such methods include Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) (Andrews, 1998, Clemens, 2002, Ericson and Ll, 1999, Lee et al., 1985, 
Tanaka et al., 1983), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Andrews and Dunnett, 2000, Baraldi and 
Zio, 2008, Kenarangui, 1991), Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) (Gran and Helminen, 2001, 
Trucco et al., 2008). The dynamic techniques directly model the behavior and dynamics 
of a system. Examples of such include Petri Nets Analysis (PNA) (Liu and Chiou, 1997, 
Leveson and Stolzy, 1987), Multi-Agent Modeling(Blom et al., 2006), Markov chain 
modeling, and dynamic event trees (Durga Rao et al., 2009).  
Since the focus of this research is on the safety metrics, rather than the methods, the 
details of these methods will not be discussed. See (Netjasov, 2010) for a review of risk 
modeling and safety assessment methods in aviation. 
2.3.2.2 Safety Metrics 
Frequency based metrics: Frequency based metrics are used to describe the past 
accident data and project future trends of system safety performance. The most widely 
used safety metric is “the count of accidents (fatalities, loss of aircraft) per unit 
time/unit distance”. Other similar metrics include number of incidents per million flights,  




hour (Brooker, 2004, Netjasov, 2010). The current level of safety in the current ATC is 
about 1 disastrous accident per 107 flight hours (Savage, 2013). The denominator has a 
dramatically long period because air traffic accidents are extremely rare. In the US, over 
the span of 10 years (2005-2014), there was a total of 12 fatal commercial aviation 
accidents, and world wide, 72 (Airplanes, 2015).  
Probability based metrics: Probabilistic metrics focus on specific scenarios and 
probabilistic risk of accidents. Many simulation based safety assessment approaches, 
such as petri nets (Netjasov et al., 2013), Monte Carlo Method (Baraldi and Zio, 2008, 
Stroeve et al., 2009), mutli-agent models (Stroeve et al., 2013, Blom et al., 2006) use 
“risk” as the safety measure. In these cases, the risk is synonymous to the “probability of 
occurrence” of the concerned accident. Generally, risk estimate will involve both 
likelihood/probabilities and severity associated with accidents (Siu, 1994). Variations of 
expertise in the analysts directly affect the completeness and accuracy of results.  
Another critical challenges to implement the probabilistic metric, is that safety critical 
systems are almost perfectly safe (Amalberti, 2001). As mentioned previously, the target 
values of probabilistic risk are at the order of f 10-7 to 10-10 per aircraft flight hour (Blom 
et al.). A single accident will introduce significant fluctuation to the safety levels using 
such metrics (Brooker, 2002a). 
Comparison in the quantitative safety assessments of ATC is between two extremely 
small numbers. When both numbers have an uncertainty of more than one magnitude 
of the estimated values, say between 10−10 ∓ 102 and 10−12 ∓ 102, the comparison 




Metrics of incidents: Some metrics use incident data to infer safety. Close proximity 
indicator (CPI) for example measures the closest distance of two aircraft in the case of 
loss of separation. Similarly, Severity Scores, Actual Separation Breach, Incident not 
resolved by ATC (INRA) are other metrics that use incident data (Brooker, 2007).  
The drawback to incident data is that incident data are incomplete due to various 
complication factors, e.g. pilots fear of penalties. In 2011, Euro Control Safety 
Regulation Commission estimates that only half of incidents are reported.  
2.3.2.3 Safety Performance and “System Control Capacity” 
In Rasmussen’s view of safety as a control problem (Rasmussen, 1997), he first brought 
about the concept of “loss of control boundary”. Rasmussen promoted that safety 
management should make the loss-of-control boundary explicit and visible to the actors, 
and “increase the margin” from this boundary. The margin arguably is a manifest of a 
system’s control capacity.  
The categorical counterpart of control capacity, “controllability”, that whether a system 
has some control capacity or not, was first introduced to the safety engineering context 
by Saleh and Bakolas (Saleh and Bakolas, 2009). Controllability has its origin from 
control theory (Kalman, 1959, Klamka, 2013). This concept of controllability and 
observability was brought into the safety engineering context to compensate the effect 
from using “defense in depth” safety strategy in safety critical systems. Controllability is 
defined as the ability of bringing an accident initiating event back to the “safe zone” in 




“pathogens”. Controllability and observability are used as principles to examine the 
processes, rather than safety measures. 
The use of controllability as a safety measures is also seen in the EuroControl SAfety 
Regulatory Requirement (ESARR) Advisory Material 2/ Guidance Document 5 (EAM 
2/GUI 5), as shown in Figure 2-7. They view controllability (highlighted in Figure 2-7) as 
the system capacity available to resolve an impending accident. However, it was not 
indicated how this controllability should be evaluated. 
 
Figure 2-7: Air Traffic Control System Risk Analysis (SRC, 2005) 
Despite the wide acceptance of correlation between system control and safety, and 
implications of a ‘safety margin’, by the discussed research, system control capacity, as a 
quantifiable system property in the safety engineering context, has not been formally 
defined; and the relation between system control capacity and safety performance has 




address these gaps, and examine the viability of using system controllability as a safety 
performance metric. 
2.4 Summary  
This chapter reviewed the current research on ATC safety and safety assessments. The 
research on system control and system safety, as well as system control capacity and 
safety performance is placed in the ATC safety assessment and management research 
context. Two observations are made from reviewing the existing research. First, there is 
no formal definition of a quantifiable control effectiveness measure, which we call 
“control capacity” in the context of safety engineering. Second, although the correlation 
between system control and safety have been well studied and documented in the 
literature, this system control capacity as a potential system safety performance 
measure was never discussed.  The literature review reinforces needs to explore the 
research questions proposed in Section 1.3. The following chapters detail the 





CHAPTER 3. DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES 
This chapter builds the theoretic basis for assessing system safety performance with 
system control capacity, including formal definitions and assumption statements of this 
research. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 detail peripheral ideas, concepts, and theories, which are 
important in the understanding of system control capacity. Control is abstracted as the 
interactions between a system, the controller, and a process, the controlled. Variations 
on both sides are demonstrated to have an impact on the system’s control capacity. To 
understand the controller, the control system is placed first in the general system 
theories for the most fundamental features, then a discussion on complicating factors 
that affect its control capacities. A process is generalized as a state transition from the 
current state to a desired state. Founded upon the proceeding sections and from the 
literature, formal definitions of system control capacity and the research assumption 
statements are given in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
3.1 The Concept of Control Capacity 
3.1.1 Variation of control capacity 
The Oxford dictionary defines control as “the power to influence or direct people’s 
behavior or the course of events”. In engineering systems, the verb “control”, refers to 




Control systems take many forms, but ultimately can be abstracted as a controller, a 
controlled process and the bidirectional interaction between them. As is illustrated in 
Figure 3-1, the controller acts on the process to change its characteristics, e.g. pressure, 
speed, or power output; the controlled process exhibits information regarding the effect 
of the controller’s acts, which is necessary for serving the purpose desired by the 
controller, as it guides the control to move towards the desired outcome. 
 
Figure 3-1 Control in simplest form 
Capacity is the ability or power to do, experience, or understand something (Oxford 
Dictionary, 1989). Combined with the definition of control, the term “control capacity” 
therefore is the power of a “control system” to influence or direct people’s behavior or 
the course of events.  
In the safety engineering context, I define the set of “active” controls as those control 
activities that are driven by actively monitoring and influencing the controlled processes. 
In contrast, the set of “passive” controls does not change the course of events; they 
simply contain and control the severity of accident consequences. For example, in a 
nuclear power plant, active control is through the operator’s constant monitoring of 
reactor outputs, whereas an example of passive control measure is the concrete walls 




In principle, for an active control means to have an effect, there should always be some 
power of the system to influence the development of the process, and hence some 
control capacity. Since some systems are safer than others, there should also be 
variations of systems’ control power/control capacity in attaining their control 
objectives. In other words, some system should have higher control capacity than others.  
3.1.2 Contributing factors to control capacity variations 
Consider Figure 3-2, where three systems are used to switch a light on/off in a room. 
System I has the controller standing next to the light switch and the light can be directly 
controlled by flipping the switch. In System II, the controller is away from the room and 
can access the switch through instrumentation, e.g., using Labview. In System III, the 
controller can also control the switch via instrumentation; additionally, the controller 
can command an operator in the room to switch the light through telecommunication.  
All three systems have some control capacity over the process: switch Light from 
ON/OFF. The following observations can be made however to distinguish control 
capacities among the different systems, over this same process.  
• System I has more direct access to the switch and hence the light. 
• System II requires more intermediate steps between the controller and the switch, 
compared to System I; and compared to System II it has not alternative control 
means, should the instrumentation fail. 
• System III, compared to System I, does not have as much direct access to the switch, 






   
a) System I b) System II c) System III 
Figure 3-2 Light Switch Systems with Differing Controllability and Observability 
In comparing the three control systems intuitively, over the same process, System II 
appears to possess the lease control capacity, since it is not as direct as System I, and 
does not have as many control means as System III. However, between Systems I and III, 
it is unclear which one is more capable of control. The system property that 
differentiates the three control systems in their control activities, control capacity, is the 
subject of this research. If quantification of control capacity is possible, the comparison 
between the different systems can then be carried out with confidence.  
The above thought experiment also uncovers two factors which play important roles in 
determining the control capacity of a system: 
1. Directness: Control capacity decreases as the control “route” becomes less direct. 
2. Redundancy: Control capacity increases as the number of control “routes” increases. 
Now if the same system is used to control different processes, how do the control 
abilities vary? In answering this question, compare three control systems illustrated in 




   
a) Process I b) Process II c) Process III 
Figure 3-3 Controllability varying with processes 
In Figure 3-3, the same control mechanism is applied to controls of three different 
processes. Process I is the control of a Light on/off as is in Figure 3-2. Process II is the 
control of the rotational speed of a fan. Process III is the control of a room’s 
temperature, by increasing/decreasing air circulation in the room. 
Compare the three processes. Process I appears to be easiest to control, since there are 
only two possible states, i.e. {LIGHT ON} and {LIGHT OFF} and the control action is 
apparent.  
Process II, compared to Process I, is a more complex task. To change fan speed from one 
to another will require more delicate operations of the control dial than that on a switch.  
Process III is the most complicated one to control. In this process, states are measured 
in temperatures. To change room temperature from one value to another, the fan is 
used to increase airflow. This process is even more demanding in the operation task of 
dials. 
All three control systems have a second means of control via telecommunication. In this 
case natural language will have to be used in delivering control commands. In Natural 




commands (e.g., 1 = ON, 0 = OFF). The more complex the control task, the more 
demanding it is in avoiding miscommunication. 
In summary, this example demonstrates that for a system to control over different 
processes there is also distinguishable variation in the control system’s control capacity. 
The factors that affect control capacity, uncovered by this simple example include:  
1) Size of the state space, e.g. Process I compared to Process II; 
2) Size of solution space, e.g. System + Process I, compared to System + Process II; 
3) Complexity of the control command messages e.g. controls via instrumentation 
compared to controls via telecommunication. 
Thus far, I have discussed and demonstrated the general concept of control capacity and 
its variations due to system and process differences. The concept is generalizable to any 
control systems with different control purposes. 
3.2 System 
The term “system” is used in nearly all scientific and engineering disciplines, and refers 
to artifacts of various forms, constituents and scales. General Systems Theory (GST) is a 
field that unifies studies of systems across disciplines and works with issues common to 
all systems. 
As per GST, a general system is any construct or collection of elements whose 
interactions fulfill certain objective(s) or purpose(s) (Hall and Fagen, 1956). While 
controls can be generalized to any system including biological and ecological, here the 
focus is on systems designed and engineered by humans to serve humans. These 
systems are made of hardware, software, equipment, facilities, personnel, processes, 




element here is a generalized term for all possible system constituents, regardless of its 
level of abstraction or form of existence. 
Here, the term “system” is used both in the control system that consists of the 
controller and the controlled process, and the controller by itself. The limiting word 
“control” before the system in the former is purposely used to differentiate between 
the two. The controller itself is referred to as a system to be consistent with the subject 
of this study, the ATC. As per FAA definitions, the ATC “system”, provides a service to 
ATC users, air traffic in its controlled space. The control system to be analyzed will 
include both the ATC system, and its controlled traffic which in this research is referred 
to as the “process”.  
Control capacity varies as the system or controller change. To understand the 
dimensions of systems’ variations, we resort to GST for the basic traits of a system.  
3.2.1 Basic views of a general system 
In GST, there are three fundamental views of any given system: structure, function, and 
attributes (Bertalanffy, 1968, Torokhti, 1975, Skyttner 2005 and Boulding, 1956). 
Structure View: In the structure view, a system is described as a collection of objects 
and relationships. Symbolically (Bertalanffy, 1968, Klir 1991, and Skyttner, 2005 ), 
 𝑃𝑠: = 𝑂 × 𝑡                (3.1) 
Where O is the well-defined object set of the system, that is, its elements are 
enumerable.  




“×” defines the Cartesian product between two sets. The Cartesian product of two sets 
𝐴1 and 𝐴2 is defined as: 
 𝐴1 × 𝐴2 = {(𝑎1,𝑎2):𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑖 ,∀𝑖} (3.2) 
Visually, this definition system can be interpreted as a graph, shown in Figure 3-4.  
 
Figure 3-4 Structural view of a system 
Function View: In some cases, it is useful to pack part or all of the system as a function 
that expresses input-output behavior at a higher level. The input-output relationship is 
analogous to a black box, whose internal mechanism is not, or need not to be known by 
its observers or users. The input and output patterns will serve certain useful and 
consistent purposes, and thus a function. 
Symbolically, the function view describes a system as (Torokhti and Howlett, 1975): 
 𝑃𝐹: 𝐼 ⟶ 𝑌 (3.3) 
Where, 𝐼 is the input set and 𝑌 is the abstract output set. 
The functional view of a system is illustrated in Figure 3-5. 
 





Attribute View: In the attribute view, a system can be abstracted into a set of attributes 
that characterize the system. System attributes can be logical such as the state of a light: 
“ON” or “OFF”, or quantifiable, such as the speed of a train. Some attributes can be 
directly measured e.g. temperature and pressure, while others are indirect manifest of 
system characteristics e.g. reliability and stability.  
Symbolically, a system from the attribute view can be expressed as (Kalman, 1959) and 
(Torokhti, 1975) 
 𝑃𝐴 ≔ {𝑥1(𝑡), 𝑥2(𝑡), … 𝑥𝑛(𝑡)}. (3.4) 
Where, 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) is the value of attribute 𝑥𝑖  at time 𝑡. 
The three basic views of a general system are considered enriched and extended 
definitions of a system, following its general definition in Section 3.2. Concepts 
elaborated and illustrated here including function, attributes and structure will be used 
in the proposed metrics and method of this research. Additionally, they provided basis 
for understanding of the nature of variations of different systems. 
3.2.2 Complexity of ATC systems 
An ATC system will vary as its structures, functions, and attributes change. Controls of 
ATC also rely on other structural, functional and attributes-related complex features 
that affect the system’s control capacity.  
Stroeve pointed out factors that makes an ATC system complex including: 1) The 
number and types of entities (human roles, technical systems), 2) number and type of 
interdependencies between entities, 3) degree of geographical distribution, 4) type of 




situations/conditions that may decrease the level of safety (Stroeve et al., 2009). The 
five features may be traced back to the basic views of a system, but they are discussed 
separately here to illustrate the complexity of the problem.  
Hierarchy: The ATC system has a distinguishable hierarchy in its organization and 
operations directing air traffic (Haraldsdottir et al., 2001), from national flow planning, 
to center/facility planning and sector control.  Hierarchy is the organization of system 
elements, which ranks some above others, e.g. according to levels of authority. The 
STAMP model illustrated a hierarchical pattern of hierarchy in social-technical systems 
where higher levels, e.g. regulatory agencies have higher authorities over lower levels, 
e.g. management. The hierarchy is a system structural characteristic, but bears other 
distinctive and complex features as well, e.g. levels of abstraction (DeLaurentis, 2005).  
Integration of humans and automations: In ATC, humans and automations are closely 
knit to share responsibility of surveillance and control of the system. Automated 
systems have high computing speed, and can store and process large amounts of 
information (Wickens, 1998). In comparison, humans have the advantage of being 
flexible, tactical and more adaptive to dynamic and complex processes.  
The integration of human and automation is a highlighted feature of the group of social-
technical systems; it brings many challenges to the operations and understanding of the 
such systems, including introduction of unknown safety hazards (Wickens, 1998). In the 
Uberlingen mid-air collision accident for example, the conflicting commands from the 




uncoordinated collision maneuvers and consequently, the collision accident (German 
Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation, 2002). 
Interdisciplinary: Control in ATC is the integrated effort of all system elements including 
hardware, software, personnel, and facilities. The human components, in particular, 
play important roles in assuring the ATC safety. The comprehensive understanding of 
the system elements’ and the overarching system’s behaviors requires a cross-
disciplinary effort from a spectrum of studies on system theories, psychology, and 
economics, to name a few (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Geographically distributed: The ATC system infrastructure is highly distributed. Like 
many other systems, the decisions made remotely need to be delivered to the operators 
or actuation units. Likewise, the information at the end of operations needs to report to 
the decision makers often at a different location. Missed, distorted, late or ambiguous 
information can lead to failed functions and even cause accidents to occur (Leveson, 
2004). Therefore, communication is particularly important to accurately and timely 
facilitate the interaction between system elements.  
3.3 Process 
Control objectives: A Controller by itself does not have safety concerns; whether a 
control system is safe or not depends on the processes to be controlled. In safety 
control in particular, the act of control is activated by the need of the system at the start 
of the control, the initial system state. If the state is projected by the controller as 




Safety control, in general is to accomplish this transition from a perceivably unsafe state 
to a safe state.  
This type of “event-driven, continuously having to react to external and internal stimuli” 
system can be viewed as a reactive system (Harel, 1987). The ATC system can be 
classified as a reactive system: “internal stimuli” occurs at critical sections of a flight, e.g. 
taking off, landing, and crossing borders of a controlled sector; external stimuli are 
beyond routines, although still expected, e.g. resolve conflict between two aircraft, and 
assist pilots in distress.  
States: A state is the particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific 
time (Davis, 2005). The selections of the conditions and criteria for determining the 
states based on the conditions are arbitrary. It may vary with the viewers’ perceptions, 
and purposes of the state selection. 
In control theories, system states are expressed by a set of state variables(Hall and Fagen, 1956). 
These variables can be continuous, discrete or descriptive, but in general, they should 
characterize behaviors of the control system, or the processes to be controlled. The 
control theories define the each unique combination of the state variables to be a 
system state. This is equivalent to defining state for a time instance.  
For safety controls, as long as the destination state is considered safe, defining value 
differentiated states may not be necessary. In this case, the state is characterized by a 
zone of state variable values. For example, to resolve a conflict between two aircraft, 
there may be many solutions: one aircraft climbs, the other descends, or the other way 




etc. The resultant state does not require the aircraft to be at certain positions. To 
express states as zones, both the choices of the state variables and the values of the 
variables need to attend to the purpose of the analysis.  
The set of all possible states constitutes the state space. Bahill pointed out that a system 
state has two basic properties 1) it characterizes the system for a period of time 
(representiveness) and 2) it is different from other states (Bahill, 2011). Additionally, at 
any given time, the system is in exactly one of the states from the state space. See 
(Wasson, 2011) for a survey of the definitions of system states.  
These three characteristics of system states/state space representiveness, mutual 
exclusiveness and exhaustiveness are necessary criteria for valid definition of system 
state space.   
Dynamics and Control: As previously discussed, a controlled process can be abstracted 
and described as a state transition, from the current state to a target state, e.g. to move 
from an unsafe to a safe state. The driving ‘forces’ of transitions, in the general sense, 
are necessary inputs/events and system conditions (Ptolemaeus, 2014). The study of 
state transition trajectories, in relation to the influence, or driving forces, is the subject 
of system dynamics. System dynamics can be described with equations, indexing tables, 
linguistic descriptions or graphs. 
When the transition or trajectory of system states can be deliberately manipulated to 
yield desired utilities or functions, the system is controlled. In control systems, the 
decision maker subjectively aligns the state transition with the purpose and function of 




3.4 Define system control capacity in the context of safety engineering 
Control capacity is a general property to all control systems. From the safety perspective, 
we define control capacity as follows:  
Definition: Control capacity is the extent for a control system to withstand performance 
deviation in acquiring its control objectives. 
This definition underlines the assumption that if performances of the system or parts of 
the system do not deviate, there would be no safety events. System elements are 
designed to serve purposes and required to meet certain constraints, without which the 
system will not function as intended. Disturbance, disruption, degradation and faults 
drive the system elements to deviate from the designed performance, which creates the 
conditions for an accident to occur. The definition is applicable to any general system, 
and not limited to ones with mathematical models. 
Control capacity with this definition is an indicator of system’s tolerance of performance 
deviations. Referring to the dictionary definition of control, control capacity measures 
the “power of influence”, by examining its tolerance of losing this power.  
3.5 Relate system control capacity to system safety performance 
Based on research on system safety and control, we elicit three statements that 
constitute the theoretic basis for using control capacity to measure a system’s safety 
performance. 





A safe system is first controllable. Conversely, an uncontrollable system is unsafe. This 
assumption was elicited from (Saleh and Bakolas, 2009) and also considered self-evident.  
Assumption 2: Control capacity is an indicator of the system’s performance in the control 
of safety critical processes.  
To interpret this assumption, first define safety critical process as follows: 
Definition: Safety critical process is state transition 𝑝:𝑋𝐼 → 𝑋𝐷, whose failure will result 
in unsafe consequence, where 𝑋𝐼 is an arbitrary initial state, presumably undesirable and 
𝑋𝐷 a desirable state. 
Control capacity is a generic property common to any control systems, but when it 
comes to the control of safety critical processes, it becomes safety critical to stay 
controllable in despite of performance deviations. the system’s control capacity, which 
measures the resilient power to performance deviation, is then an indicator of system 
safety performance. In other words, the knot that ties the quantitative measure control 
capacity and system’s safety performance is the system’s safety critical processes.  
Assumption 3: Between two similar control systems (of the same safety critical process), 
the higher the system’s control capacity, the safer the system (Rasmussen, 1997). 
A safe control system should have some tolerance over performance deviation, and 
therefore some control capacity. Control capacity with our definition is an indicator of 
system’s tolerance under performance deviation. For example, how much component 
failure can the system tolerate before loss of control, or how much delay can the system 




The only thing that does not change is change itself. It is unlikely a system will act 
exactly as expected, due to changing environment, operational conditions, equipment 
degradation etc. There is always some performance deviation occurring throughout the 
life cycle of a system. Safer systems should be more resilient to fault, disturbance, 
degradation and disruption, than less safe systems. Control capacity is defined as a 
measure of such ability. Therefore, in the control of safety critical processes, higher 
control capacity is always desired for safety, if allowed by other system constraints.  
These three assumption statements constitute the theoretic basis for justifying the use 
of control capacity as a safety performance measure, and following research to develop 
metrics and methods of control capacity based safety assessment of air traffic control 
systems. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the concept of system control capacity is formally defined and 
decomposed. System control is divided into two parts: the system that controls and the 
process to be controlled. When the controlled process is safety critical, system control 
capacity is relevant to system’s safety performances. Comparing systems with different 
configurations requires quantification of system control capacity. The following chapters 
describe metrics and methods for evaluating system control capacity, for quantitative 





CHAPTER 4. ASSESS SYSTEM SAFETY WITH CONTROL CAPACITY-PART I: METRICS 
Recall Figure 3-1, where control is abstracted as the interaction between the controller  
and the controlled process. Also in Chapter 3, arguments are made that variation on 
either side will result in changes of a system’s control capacity, “the extent to withstand 
performance deviation”.  
On the controller side, the two most common and concerning performance deviations 
are failure and faults. Failures are losses of function, and faults are malfunctions. This 
aspect of control capacity is selected to represent the control mechanism quality, and 
measured by a Probabilistic System Control capacity (PSC) metric. When the controlled 
process is concerned, timing is an important and holistic aspect for safety control 
(Leveson, 2004, Tian et al., 2012, Landry, 2012). The performance deviation related to 
timing is delay. For this reason, a Temporal System Control capacity (TSC) is introduced 
here to represent the variation of processes as well as impacts of such variations on 





4.1 Probabilistic System Control Capacity 
4.1.1 Definition  
Definition: A system 𝐾’s Probabilistic System Control capacity (PSC) over a process 
𝑝:𝑋𝐼 → 𝑋𝐷, 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐾,𝑝) is the probability of System K to preserve at least one means of 
control, in the presence of partial failures or faults: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐾,𝑝) = 𝑃(⋃𝐹𝑖) (4.1) 
Where,  
𝑋𝐼:  Current state of the process; 
𝑋𝐷: Desired state of the process;  
𝐹𝑖: The event “to retain Means of Control 𝑖”. 
Since the probability of preserving at least one means of control is equivalent to one 
minus the probability of losing all means of control, which is sometimes easier to obtain, 
we can use either formula to evaluate 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐾, 𝑝): 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐾,𝑝) = 𝑃(⋃𝐹𝑖) = 1 − 𝑃(⋂𝐹𝚤�) (4.2) 
Where ⋂𝐹𝚤� denotes the event “all means of control are lost”. 
Process 𝒑:𝑿𝑰 → 𝑿𝑫: The concepts of state, state transitions and safety critical processes 
are detailed in Chapter 3. To reiterate, system states are arbitrary characteristic 
descriptions of system at different times or under different conditions. The state space 
of a system is the collection of all possible states. Within the system’s state space, the 
system can move from one state to another. In this respect, processes are state 
transitions. Safety critical processes are a subset of all possible state transitions, whose 




Means of control: A means of control from a function perspective is the minimal set of 
functions capable of controlling the process, and from a system structure perspective, 
the minimal set of system elements.  
This definition is more suited for systems with complex architectures, which provide 
more than one means of control. As discussed in Chapter 2, redundancy is a commonly 
used strategy for safety assurance in safety critical systems, like the ATC systems.  
Means of controls may or may not be independent from each other. In the design 
phases, a system will go through cost benefit tradeoffs. For costly changes, like ATC 
infrastructures, it is but reasonable to design redundancy for only “critical parts” of the 
system whose performance increase is most necessary and rewarding. “Non-critical” 
parts of the system will be shared by the different means of control. This cost-effective 
safety strategy determines that the resultant system architecture will have coupled 
control means. 
A second reason for multiple means of control is the need for collaboration in the 
overall controller-process task. The US ATC, at the highest level, is responsible for air 
traffic in the national airspace. The hierarchy of the control structure divides the overall 
task to manageable sizes for individual controllers. In this task division, multiple 
controllers may be assigned to control the same process; this is referred to as 
overlapping control (Leveson, 2004). The incentive for overlapped responsibility 
assignment is to allow cross-examinations, which reinforces the safety guards. 
Facilitating the collaborations between the overlapped responsible parties may require 




Additionally, infrastructure systems like ATC evolve over time. The addition of new 
components, procedures and concepts of operations are not in some original design 
plans. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, there is a tradition to overlapping new 
components to the current system to create a “defense in depth”, against accidents. For 
these reasons, redundant control means are intrinsic to the design and development of 
safety critical systems.  
Failure and faults: We distinguish loss of control from effectiveness of control in that 
the former concerns loss of the function, and is often the result of failures, while the 
latter may include malfunction as well, often resulting from faulty interactions between 
system components. 
The causes of performance deviation cannot be exhaustively enumerated when all 
system types are considered, but a general taxonomy of faults can be theorized. With 
the system safety be considered as a control problem, Leveson summarized the factors 
contributing to ineffective control under the STAMP model assumptions including 1) 
inadequate enforcement of constraints, 2) inadequate execution of control actions and 
3) inadequate or missing feedback (Leveson, 2004). The more detailed list of causes to 
control inadequacies is found in (Leveson, 2004).  
Probabilistic Risk and PSC: Risk is often expressed as the probability of the occurrence 
of a specified undesirable events (failure, accidents etc.) and estimates of their 
consequences (amount of losses, damages, injury, etc.). Probabilistic risk refers to only 




The measure PSC and probabilistic risk share many similarities. If evaluated for the same 
undesirable consequence such as a collision accident, PSC can be an estimate of collision 
risk. The difference however is that PSC examines from the control perspective; it builds 
on the assumption that system safety and accident prevention is a control problem. In 
contrast, evaluation of probabilistic risk does not specify how the “undesirable 
consequence” is prevented. For example, probabilistic risk can be derived from direct 
simulation of a system’s behavior (Blom et al., 2006). 
Estimated PSC: One challenge to quantitatively assess safety in safety critical systems is 
the lack of accident data. The proposed measure, PSC, as defined, requires knowledge 
of the probabilities of unlikely events, which are difficult to acquire. The values of the 
needed probabilities, in practice should be elicited from experts, resources, as are the 
case with other Probabilistic Risk Assessments methods.  
The focus of this measure however is at the system level and interactions between 
different means of control. Therefore, the hazardous events are identified at higher 
levels as well, e.g. subsystem failure, compared to those needed in a PRA study, e.g. 
device failure. The values of probabilities for subsystem level hazard events are 
expected to be based on judgments. Since the primary utility of PSC is to differentiate 
the control capacities of different control systems, and not to obtain the absolute risks, 
the accuracy of these probabilities is therefore assumed secondary. This assumption will 




4.1.2 PSC illustrated 
This section uses an example to illustrates the concept and estimation of PSC. We apply 
the PSC definition to the example used in Section 3.1: controlling of a light from ON to 
OFF. From the illustration in Figure 3-1, first extract the control mechanisms on the 
process {LIGHT ON} → {LIGHT OFF}. Use the structure view of a system, this control 
mechanism is represented by directed graphs (Henley and Kumamoto, 1985), as shown 
in Table 4-1.  
Table 4-1 Control Models of Simple Systems 




Since PSC considers the system’s tolerance to failure and faults, naturally, the next step 
is to find possible faults and failures that may hinder the control process. A preliminary 
hazard identification (for fault and failure) provides that System I may have the 
following possible faults and failures: 1) wires between switch and light are 




turn the switch. Similar “hazard identification” processes can be made to the other two 
systems.  
From here, we may use PSC as the measure to assess, compare and identify the systems 
that are more resistant to failure. In System I and II, there is no redundancy, that is, if 
any of the system element fails, there will be no substitute counterparts. Whereas in 
System III, should the automation fail, the system may still manage to control the light 
via the operator. On the other hand, for System III, it is possible that combining Means 1: 
the error prone communications between operator and controller, and Means 2, the 
unreliable automation system, it is not as effective and dependable as the only control 
means in System I, having the controller directly control the switch.  
To quantify the difference and make the comparison, the next step is to compile all 
identified hazards into a hazard list, rank these hazards according to their likelihood, and 
assign an estimated probability of occurrence to each hazard. Occurrence of a single 
hazard may or may not induce loss of control, the final step is to enumerate all possible 
combinations of hazards that does and find the likelihood for each of the system in 
losing all means of control, or preserving at least one means of control, or PSC. 
The choice of probability values presumably will have an impact on the result. The most 
credible way to estimate these values is to use reliabilities of system elements if 
available, and resort to experts otherwise. Alternatively, impacts on the choices of the 
hazards can be proactively tested to find boundaries of the values when qualitative 




are more aligned with empirical or historical data. This alternative approach will also 
give a level of confidence on the conclusion drawn from the comparison. 
The example demonstrates the three basic needs of quantitative safety assessments: a 
control model, a list of hazards, and probabilities of hazards. Note in this example, the 
process to be controlled, {Light ON} to {Light OFF}, is obvious; however for more 
complex scenarios, a systemic approach to safety critical process identification may be 
desired. The previous chapter establishes the argument that relevance of control 
capacity to a system’s safety performance depends on the “safety critical processes”. 
Chapter 5 will elaborate on principles and procedures recommended to identify “safety 
critical processes”, for quantitative safety assessments. 
4.2 Temporal System Control Capacity  
Delay is a common type of performance deviation in human-centered, and 
geographically distributed systems; in the control of “safety critical process”, however, 
delays can result in unsafe consequences. A safe system should always tolerate some 
delays, this higher this tolerance, over all of its safety critical processes, the safer the 
system. A temporal system control capacity (TSC) measures a system’s control capacity, 
when the performance deviation, delays are concerned.  
4.2.1 Definition  
Definition: The Temporal System Control Capacity 𝑇𝑃𝑃(𝐾, 𝑝) for a system 𝐾 and over a 
process 𝑝:𝑋𝐼 → 𝑋𝐷, 𝑇𝑃𝐾(𝐾,𝑝), is the difference between the time available, 𝑡𝐴, and the 
time required, 𝑡𝑅:  




Where, 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑡𝑅 are defined as follows: 
Definition: time available 𝑡𝐴 is the time difference between the time instance when the 
forming of an accident is detected by the controller and that when the accident occurs, 
should no control be applied. 
Without control, the system state evolves over time following relevant physical, 
organizational, and regulatory principles. The time for the process to evolve from the 
current unsafe and undesirable state to a new safe and desirable state therefore can be 
calculated applying the principles.  
Time available is calculated as a reference. In reality, when an unsafe process is 
detected by the controller, should a control resolution exist given the situation, a 
controller presumably will always attempt to resolve the situation. Therefore, the case 
that an imminent accident is detected and no control will be applied is extremely 
unlikely. 
Definition: Time required 𝑡𝑅 is the expected time consumption for a safety control to 
initiate and take effect in response to detection of a safety threat. 
The core component in a control system is the controller. Safety control is often 
motivated by external stimuli or the episodic needs to handle a safety threat; it is 
initiated and deactivated by the controller. Under the no performance deviation 
assumption, time required is the nominal and expected time for a control action to be 
generated and to take effect. Each component involved in the control process will 




Traffic surveillance systems such as the radars collect positions of aircraft continuously. 
The control loop used for safety assurance will not be activated however until the 
controller recognizes any threat to safety. For example, the precursor event to accident 
that two aircraft enter collision course, under the control of air traffic controller, is often 
detected at the violation of separation standards. Before the relative distance of the 
two aircraft reach the standard separation, likely no control action will be initiated or 
taken.  
Implications of TSC: In any case, time required 𝑡𝑅 for a control action to take effect 
should be at least as large as the time available 𝑡𝐴, to assure safety. Preferably, the 
bigger the difference (TSC), the more capable the system is to handle delays during 
operations. Delay from the expected values at any part of the system is considered a 
performance deviation. In the control of safety critical processes, excessive delays are 
not acceptable. If the control fails to take effect in time, an unsafe event, or accident, 
will result. 
From the design perspective, the system should be designed with positive TSC. This can 
be accomplished in a number of ways. First time required can be reduced through 
technological advancements such as upgraded infrastructure and inclusion of 
automation assistance. Another effective way to increase TSC is through early detection. 
This however is a conflicting goal to other constraints in the traffic control. For example, 
the increase of separation standards will allow early detection, but it will also reduce the 




With the measure of TSC, strategies should also be sought as to how to avoid excessive 
delays that may exhaust the time buffer indicated by TSC. For the case when TSC is 
possibly negative, investigations are necessary to identify measures for increasing TSC.  
4.2.2 TSC illustrated 
The definitions are better explained with an example. Consider a collision avoidance 
scenario, shown in Figure 4-1. When two neighboring aircraft become conflicted, i.e. 
enter a collision course, without control the two aircraft will eventually collide. If the 
conflict is detected in time, with the control of air traffic controller, for instance, actions 
will be taken and resolving maneuvers will be applied. At a certain time, the two aircraft 
will be deconflicted and no longer on a collision course. 
   
Figure 4-1 Time required and time available 
𝒕𝑨: As is shown in Figure 4-1, at 𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑖𝐶𝐶 on the time axis, two aircraft enter a collision 
course. Without the control or intervention of ATC, the two aircraft will collide at 




 𝑡𝐴 = 𝑡𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑛𝐶 − 𝑡𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 (4.4) 
𝒕𝑹: The same time instance 𝑡𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴, when an unsafe situation is detected by ATC, is the 
initial time instance. In response to the conflict detection, conflict resolution will be 
made and transmitted to the pilot as control commands for execution. This process will 
take certain amount of time, and the end of this process, when controller confirms no 
further action is needed, is marked 𝑡𝑅𝐴𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐴. Then  
 𝑡𝑅 = 𝑡𝑅𝐴𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑅𝐴𝐴 − 𝑡𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 (4.5) 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, two metrics of control capacity are defined: Probabilistic System Control 
capacity (PTSC) and Temporal System Control capacity (TSC). PSC is a metric for the 
system’s tolerance of faults or failures in the course of control. And TSC measures 
system’s tolerance of delay before the control objective becomes unattainable. The next 
chapter further explores the implementation and utilities of the two metrics in 





CHAPTER 5. ASSESS SYSTEM SAFETY WITH CONTROL CAPACITY PART II: METHODS  
To use the previously introduced two control capacity metrics, PSC and TSC, in 
quantitative safety assessments of ATC systems, additional setups are required. This 
chapter introduces a procedural method assembled to evaluate PSC and TSC, for the 
purpose of quantitative safety assessments. The method includes three sequential steps: 
1) identify safety critical processes, 2) develop control models, and 3) evaluate PSC and 
TSC.  
5.1 Method Overview 
Recall the theoretic basis for using control capacity to measure a system’s safety 
performances in CHAPTER 2. Control processes can be characterized and described by 
states. In a control system’s state space, i.e. collection of all possible states, some states 
are unsafe, such as the accident states. System safety control is to keep the system out 
of the unsafe state zones. Safety critical processes are state transitions whose failures 
will result in unsafe event such as an accident. For the system to be safe, all safety 
critical states need to be controllable. Control capacity is an indicator of system’s safety 
performance when it comes to the control of safety critical processes. In the presence of 
performance deviations, the higher a system’s control capacity over safety critical 




For quantitative safety assessments of a given system, introduce a Control capacity 
Based Safety Assessment Framework (CBSAF), which is an assembly of procedures, 
methods and metrics required to quantify control capacity, in the control of safety 
critical processes (see Figure 5-1).  
 
Figure 5-1 CBSAF I: Safety Assessment 
Since system control and system safety are correlated through safety critical processes, 
the safety critical processes must first be identified. Once defined, for each of these 
processes, the control mechanisms must then be understood and modeled. With the 
controller and the controlled process known, the control capacity then can be evaluated 
based on the specificities of the control, i.e. estimation of PSC and TSC.  
For each of the step, CBSAF specifies general principles and guidelines needed to carry 





5.2 STAGE I: Identify Safety Critical Processes 
For a given control system, there may be multiple safety states, and many safety critical 
processes. Theoretically, for the system safety to be assured, all safety critical processes 
should be identified and controlled; for a system control capacity to represent the 
system’s safety performance, control over all possible safety critical processes must be 
examined. 
To identify safety critical processes, we use the procedure shown in Figure 5-2.  
  
Figure 5-2 Procedure to identify safety critical processes 
First, the state space must be defined. Within the state space, all possible state 
transitions can be then identified through mechanical permutation. Not all states can 
transit to each other; some state transitions are limited by physical or operational 
constraints. The exclusion of the “unattainable” transitions requires external 
determination, e.g. judged by an intelligent agent with understanding of system 




criteria are valid. The third step is to identify any proceeding transition that can lead to 
the unsafe state such as an accident. Precursor states are states that can be detected 
and escaped from in operation. The controlled escape transition from the precursor 
state to a safe state is a safety critical process.  
The recommended procedure for state space definition is outlined in Figure 5-3. The 
procedure starts with selecting a set of state variables that characterize the system 
states. Next, ranges and critical values of the state variables are determined based on 
the characteristics, time frames and circumstances that are relevant to the safety 
analysis. The choices of the state variables are dimensions of a “value space”, which is 
bounded by the extremes of the ranges of these state variables. And the critical values 
divide the value space into different zones, which is assigned as a state. In control 
theories, each combination of state variable values defines a system state. For the 
purpose of identify a finite number of state transitions and thus finite number of safety 
critical processes, the choices of critical values and the “zones” will limit the number of 
states to be concerned. For the safety purposes, states that are qualitatively safe, or 
unsafe are not limited to a particular state variable value, but a small ranges of the state 





Figure 5-3 Procedure to Define State Space 
The overarching procedure of identifying the safety critical processes holds for general 
safety assessment practice. However, the choices of state variables, ranges and critical 
values of the state variables, and criteria applied to the classification of safe, unsafety 
and transitory states may vary for cases with different purposes of analysis and analysts 
with different levels or sets of empirical experiences and expertise. In other words, 
there is a level of subjectivity in the execution of the procedures. Yet three general 
principles are to be followed in the state space definition or used to proof the 
definitions despite the specific variations.   
1) Representativeness: the state should be able to characterize the system for a period 
of time. 
2) Mutual exclusiveness: any two states are mutually exclusive, or that at any given 




3) Exhaustiveness: the state space should exhaustively represent the system at any 
time of interests. 
5.3 STAGE II: Develop System Control Model 
Control mechanisms for the safety critical processes are actualized by system elements, 
e.g. components and interactions between components. The measuring of PSC and TSC 
requires specific information about the performance deviations of the specific system 
elements that involved in the safety control, of a particular safety critical process. The 
second stage of the method identifies the system elements including components and 
component interactions, and expresses this control mechanism through the 
construction of a control model. Control models are the basis for identifying the possible 
performance deviations, i.e. failure or faults for evaluating PSC and time components for 
TSC. 
As is shown in Figure 5-4, the control model of the national air space ATC system 
developed by (Haraldsdottir et al., 2001) exhibits the hierarchy and complexity of 
national ATC. To the right hand side of the control structure, the aircraft is controlled by 
its pilot with assistance from the automated system, i.e. autopilot. When the number of 
controlled aircraft increases or the controlled airspace expands, additional control 
structures are added, for example, sector traffic control, and an outer loop of “facility 
flow planning”. The outer control loops are strategic, concerning larger airspace capacity, 
schedule and weather change; the inner control loops are more time sensitive and more 





Figure 5-4 ATC operation structure (adapted from (Haraldsdottir et al., 2001)) 
At each layer of control, the same basic feedback control mechanism is observed. Figure 
5-5 shows the basic feedback control loop.  
 
Figure 5-5 Feedback Control Loop 
As is shown in Figure 5-5, in feedback control systems, a physical process is typically 
controlled by a decision maker or a controller. Control decisions are made based on 
information collected by the sensors and applied to the process through actuators. 
Complex systems, particularly socio-technical systems, are better modeled with the 
adapted feedback control loop structure recommended by (Leveson, 2004), as shown in 
Figure 5-6.   






Figure 5-6 Feedback Control Loop Highlighting Human and Automation, adapted from 
(Leveson, 2004) 
As is shown in Figure 5-6 the adapted feedback control loop, both the human and 
automated controllers have access to the physical process through communication 
systems, sensors and actuators. However, the human controller will ultimately have 
higher authority over automation, and typically uses the automated systems to 
implement the decisions (Leveson, 2004). For instance, between pilot and auto-pilot, 
the autopilot is controlled by the pilot, and the pilot may use the autopilot to maintain 
altitude. 
The blocks in both models are functions, rather than components, that must be fulfilled 
by the control system. There is typically no one-to-one mapping from the function to 
components/system elements. A control function does not require a dedicated 
component, conversely, a system component may achieve more than one control 
function.  
Redundancy further complicates the generalization of control models. In some cases, 











function. Or combinations of some components can achieve multiple functions. The 
definition of PSC requires a systemic approach. 
To address the above two problems, CBSAF proses an adapted control model which 
takes a top down functional decomposition approach; it emphasizes the completeness 
of the general control functions rather than specific components. The model also allows 
redundant components and interactions to be organized in accordance to their 
functions. This model is shown in Figure 5-7.  
 
Figure 5-7 Adapted general system control model 
As is shown in the adapted general system control model, a control loop is generalized 
in two sequential functions: observe and control. Observe can be further decomposed 
into three sub-functions: sensing, delivery and interpretation of the controlled process. 
Similarly, the control function can also be decomposed into three sub-functions: 
generating, delivery and execution of control commands. The blocks of sensor, actuator, 
communication etc. are placed along the observe-control loop as examples of function – 





This control model serves as a starting point of constructing a control model for a safety 
critical system. It provides the first step and guidelines to map out actual system 
elements in achieving the intermediate functions required for a control loop.  
Note that in mapping the system elements to the control functions, as mentioned 
previously, there is not a one-to-one mapping between each control functions and 
system components. In some cases, more than one component or combination of 
components can achieve a control function. Similarly, combinations of some 
components can achieve multiple functions. In other words, some system elements may 
need to be placed in between the blocks assigned to the control functions, or several 
system elements are needed to be in one block. The control model provided in Figure 
5-7 serves as a starting point and a generic guideline, and not a requirement. 
For the detailed definitions and implications of function, state variable (attributes), and 
(control) structure, refer to Section 3.2.1.  
5.4 STAGE III: Evaluate Control Capacity 
As shown in Section 5.1, CBSAF uses both PSC and TSC to measure control capacity 
considering variations of systems and processes in the control loop. This section details 
the recommended procedure for estimating PSC and TSC given the control loop 
specifications from the first two steps.  
5.4.1 Evaluation of PSC 
PSC can be viewed as a special measure of risk: the risk of losing control. It can be 
assessed using any of the many readily available tools and techniques for risk 




quantify PSC for its simplicity and intuitiveness. Other probabilistic risk assessment 
techniques, such as fault tree analysis can also be adapted to estimate PSC of the 
control loop(s) derived from the first two steps.  
5.4.1.1 Overview of Event Tree Analysis 
Event tree analysis is a binary form of a decision tree for evaluating various multiple 
decision paths in a given problem. ETA was first used in WASH-1400, nuclear power 
plant safety study (Commission, 1975). It was a replacement of FTA to reduce the size of 
the tree when applied to complex system (subsystems, components, assemblies, 
software, procedures, environment, and human errors) (Ericson, 2005).  
The general process of ETA is given in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1 ETA Process adapted from (Ericson, 2005) 
Step Task Description 
1 Define the system Examine the system and define the system boundaries, 
subsystems and interfaces 
2 Identify the 
accident scenarios 
Perform a system assessment or hazard analysis to identify the 
system hazards and accident scenarios existing  in the system 
design 
3 Identify the 
Initiating Events 
(IE) 
Refine the hazard analysis to identify the significant IEs in the 
accident scenarios;  include events such as fire, collision, 
explosion, pipe break, toxic release, etc. 
4 Identify the Pivotal 
Events (PE) 
Identity the safety barriers or countermeasures involved in the 
particular scenarios that are intended to preclude a mishap 
5 Build the event 
tree diagram 
Construct the logical Event Tree Diagram(ETD), starting with IE 
then the PEs, and completing with the outcome of each path 
6 Obtain the failure 
event probabilities 
Obtain or compute the failure probabilities for the PEs on the 
ETD.  
7 Identify the 
outcome risk 
Compute the outcome risk for each path in the ETD 
8 Evaluate the 
outcome risk 







If the outcome risk of a path is not acceptable , develop design 
strategies to change the risk 
10 Document ETA Document the entire ETA process on the ETDs. Update for new 
information as necessary  
 
A generic event tree diagram is shown in Figure 5-8.  
 
Figure 5-8 Generic Event Tree Diagram 
Event trees are one of the most used tools in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The 
advantages to use ETA are highlighted in (Saleh et al., 2010). ETA combines hardware, 
software, environment and human interactions, can be applied to different levels of 
details, and models complex system in an understandable manner.  
The primary counter argument is that since ETA requires specialty of experts, for 





5.4.1.2 Recommended procedure to use ETA for PSC estimation 
A generic ETA includes three major steps: 1) identification of a hazard list, 2) acquisition 
of probabilities of each hazard, and 3) identification of chains of hazard event that lead 
to success/failure.  
The first two steps gives the control loops of the control mechanisms over identified 
safety critical processes. PSC is defined as the probability to retain at least one means of 
control. Using ETA, the three components are then 1) identification of a hazard list that 
hampers preservation of control means, 2) acquisition of probabilities associated with 
each hazard and 3) identification of chains of event that lead to the loss of all control 
means. 
To obtain these three components needed for ETA, CBSAF recommends the following 
procedure: 
1) Based on the control model and the controlled safety critical processes, conduct  
hazard identifications to as exhaustively as possible, to acquire a hazard list 
a) For each control subfunction, identify its corresponding system elements (both 
components and component interactions) 
This process should be obvious since the construction of control model, using the 
generic control model would have mapped the relevant system elements, by placing 
them in the shaded areas corresponding to each function.  
b) For each of the functions, and their corresponding system elements, identify 




c) Once completed for all six control sub-functions, the hazard identification is 
considered complete.  
2) From hazard event list in Step 1), enumerate for all chains of events that lead to loss 
of all control means 
a) In each control loop, consider the order of executions of the six control sub-
functions, sort the hazards in chronological order along the control loop, and 
place them on top of the Event Tree Diagram. 
b) Assume that each hazard either occurs or it does not occur. Use the event tree 
diagram to enumerate for all possible combinations of occurring events (or the 
opposite) that lead to the system’s loss of control, or preservation of control. 
c) Identify all possible chains of event that lead to success.  
3) Estimation of PSC 
a) Estimate the probability of each individual hazard identified in 1-c).  
b) For each event chain identified in  2-c), calculate the probability of the event 
chain, using estimation in 3-a). 
c) Sum up probabilities estimates of all identified event chain, and this is the PSC 
estimation.  
5.4.1.3 Guidelines for executing the recommended evaluation procedure 
Hazard identification: Hazard identification is qualitative and arbitrary. To increase rigor 




Leveson, where a taxonomy of possible control hazards is summarized (Leveson, 2004).  
Figure 5-9 shows the categories of control hazards defined in STAMP.   
 
 Figure 5-9 Common Hazards in a feedback control loop adapted from (Leveson, 2004) 
STPA considers all aspects of control hazards, for the estimation of PSC, not all listed PSC 
is relevant e.g. unknown hazards, and environment change and delays. Therefore, STPA 
is recommended as a reference to allow systemic hazard identification activities, but 
only relevant hazard types are to be considered and included in the event tree analysis.  
Probability of individual event: Probability of individual event can be difficult to obtain. 
In the case studies, values of probability needed are based on judgments and examined 
by sensitivity tests. Alternatively, these values can be elicited from experts or using 
performance data of the individual system elements or subsystems.  
The utility of PSC lies in comparing systems of different configurations or controls of 




of CBSAF is that, the judgment of probabilities for individual event be considered as a 
scoring, which preserves the analyst’s judgment of the relative likelihood of occurrence 
for event in the hazard list. A sensitivity test on the choice of values should then be 
conducted to investigate the validity of the conclusions drawn from the comparison, i.e. 
which system(s) has higher control capacity.  
5.4.2 Evaluation of TSC 
TSC is a measure for tolerance of delay, a type of performance deviation. Without 
performance deviation or delay, the control of a safety critical process should have at 
least some tolerance of delay, namely time available should always be greater than time 
required for the system to be safe. During operations, external or internal disruption, 
disturbance, and degradation will cause the system performance to deviate. TSC is the 
expected time buffer for system to handle the external performance deviation factors 
and therefore the higher TSC, and higher this tolerance. TSC measure becomes a safety 
performance indicator when it comes to the control of safety critical processes.  
To measure TSC, the time components are measured under the below three premises.  
1) No performance deviation and all temporal values used are nominal/expected; 
Since TSC is a measure for tolerance, the expected time buffer to tolerate system 
disruption, disturbance, and degradations, it is measured with time components at the 
expected and nominal operation conditions, where there is no performance deviation. 
2) Only one control action is needed and taken, and thus one control cycle.  
In other words, the controller only has one shot. Under Assumption 1, this is 




This research has a focus on the last minute safety scenarios when it is clear and certain 
to the controller that without control, the process will degrade into an accident. In this 
case, the time available to handle the process is often not generously larger than time 
required, to accommodate interactive controls. Especially for the ATC system which is 
geographically distributed, for the purpose of safety control, the design to 
accommodate interactive control means setting detection criteria to allow earlier 
detection. In the current spatial separation based detection criteria, i.e. at the violation 
of separation standard, this means large separation standard, which would conflict with 
the interest to increase airspace capacity. 
3) The control cycle starts with an initiating event, and ends with an exit event: the 
initiating event is a controller's recognition of the event, and the exit event is the 
controller's confirmation of the attainment of the control objective. 
Although it is rare that a system’s performance does not deviate, from a designer 
standpoint, the design has to start from somewhat nominal operational condition. Then 
taking into accounts the frequent disturbance and disruptions, the designers can 
determine the appropriate time buffer to handle these frequent delays, either through 
technologies for early detection (which increases time available), or to reduce time 
required (e.g. dedicated datalink instead of telecommunications for delivering 
commands). TSC estimates here are the time buffer that can be estimated by the 
designer/developers of the system. 




Estimate 𝒕𝑨: For each safety critical process. 𝑡𝐴 depends on the specificity of the process. 
The controlled process is subject to dynamic patterns which can be characterized by a 
set of time dependent attributes. For example, in the ATC system, the controlled 
process, air traffic, can be described by the aircraft positions, speed, heading, etc. The 
attributes of the process are ultimately functions of time. States are certain value(s) of 
the characterizing attributes such as positions.  
The system state evolves over time following the relevant physical, organizational and 
regulatory principles. The time for the process to evolve from the current state as a new 
state therefore can be calculated applying system dynamic principles. These principles 
however vary from case to case. There is no general rule to calculate the 𝑡𝐴 for all 
systems.  
Estimate 𝒕𝑹: 𝑡𝑅 is determined by steps needed for achieving control and times needed 
for each step. In estimation of TSC, a generic feedback control mechanism is used as a 
starting point for constructing a system’s control models. From the functional 
perspective, for a control loop to take effect, six control functions are to actualized 
consecutively: generating, delivering and execution of control commands, sensing 
delivery and interpretation of sensed information. As shown in Figure 5-10, the six 
functions can be unified in that all of them process information. More importantly, 





Figure 5-10 Calculating Time Required 
In the event of safety control, the control loop will be activated by a controller, upon the 
controller’s identification and recognition of safety threats. As per the feedback control 
mechanism, from this time instance, a control resolution will be generated, and 
delivered to the actuators for execution. For the control loop to reactive, then the 
process after execution will be sensed one more time, and the sensed information will 
be delivered back to the controller. If the controller interprets the control action to be 
effective and successful, the control mechanism will be deactivated.  
Applying the definition of time required, 𝑡𝑅 is estimated by the following equation. 
 𝑡𝑅 = 𝑡𝑔𝐴𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 + 𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑅𝐴𝑔𝑑,𝐶𝐶𝑛𝐶𝑔𝐶𝐶 + 𝑡𝐴𝑒𝐴𝐶𝑒𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 + 𝑡𝑠𝐴𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔+ 𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑅𝐴𝑔𝑑,𝑠𝐴𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑔𝑖𝑔𝐴𝐶𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛       (5.1) 
Control functions are actualized by system elements. The construction of control models 
is intended for mapping the control functions to its corresponding system elements. 
Actual control systems may have one component to complete more than one function, 




function may be actualized by multiple system elements, in which case, the time 
component for this function will require information on times required for each of the 
system element in the control mission.  
The problem is further convoluted by the multiplicity and coupling of control means. In 
situation when multiple control means work simultaneously, the conservative safety 
principle asks that the route with the longest time to be used in the TSC evaluation.  
The above discussion and the steps for evaluating TSC are summarized by the 
procedural chart in Figure 5-11, as part of the CBSAF framework. 
 




5.5 Summary  
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework, CBSAF, for quantitative safety 
assessment using control capacity. This framework is consisted of three main steps: I. 
identify safety critical processes, II. Develop control models and III. Evaluate control 
capacity. Detailed generalized procedure and guidelines for carrying out each of the 
procedure is given as well.  The following chapters explore the utilities and viability of 




CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY I: COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
A basic air traffic control task is to maintain minimum separation between any two 
aircraft in the controlled airspace, i.e. 5 nm horizontally, and 1000 feet vertically. A loss 
of separation conflict is undesirable, since it may be the beginning of a collision. With 
standard procedures, the ground Air Traffic Controller (ATCo) control is used for 
strategic conflict resolution to avoid the scenario of collision, while the on board 
automated collision avoidance System, e.g. Traffic Collision Alert System (TCAS) is used 
to resolve last minute collision threats.  
When a pending collision is detected by both ATCo and TCAS, both the ATCo and TCAS 
can give instructions to the pilots in making escaping maneuvers.  In the case of two 
instructions were received, standard procedures require pilots to respond only to TCAS, 
i.e., even if ATCo is instructing them, they must ignore ATCo and respond to TCAS. In the 
Uberlingen mid-air collision accident, one crew’s failure to follow this rule resulted in 
the fatal accident.  
This case study applies CBSAF to the controls of ATCo and TCAS in the control of last 
minute collision avoidance. To make the comparison, three hypothetical configurations, 
one with TCAS only, one with ATCo only, and one with both are examined.  




implementations of the theoretic CBSAF, 2) to uncover implementation issues of the 
framework, and 3) to preliminarily explore utilities by examining its capability in 
capturing the specific and expected system behavior observed in the Uberlingen mid-air 
collision accident. 
6.1 Problem description/formulation 
The scenario in question regarding the control in collision avoidance is illustrated in 
Figure 6-1a) and the internal interactions between control system components are 
illustrated in Figure 6-1b), which is a system diagram using the STAMP model (Leveson, 
2015).  
  
a) system illustration b) functional system model adapted form (Leveson, 2015) 
Figure 6-1 Control systems of collision avoidance 
As is illustrated in Figure 6-1a), in the inner loop, pilots of the two aircraft keep the 
aircraft on designated routes. The ground controllers monitor the positions of the two 
aircraft through radar systems. The information is then interpreted by the flight data 




communicate with the pilots via radio communication and provide solutions to resolve 
the conflict. TCAS, the onboard automated collision avoidance system, is used as a last 
minutes collision avoidance; its transponders interrogates with any aircraft (also with 
TCAS installed) in its close proximity and check for possible collision events. Based on its 
own predictions, TCAS will determine whether and when to issue advisory to pilots via 
audio in the cockpit. A Traffic Advisory (TA) is issued at about  35 to 48 seconds to 
impact, and a Resolution Advisory (RA) about 15 to 35 seconds (DOT, 2011). Normally, 
the two control means occur at different times following regulations and procedures.  
Note the STAMP based model also provides information about the hierarchy external to 
the control of two aircraft, which is not considered in this research. The case study is 
scoped to examine the interactions of control means during operations which concerns 
only lower levels of the system hierarchy.  
In the Uberlingen mid-air collision accident, the air traffic controller’s involvement and 
the Russian crew’s failure to follow the rules and respond to the TCAS command 
resulted in an accident. One circumstance in the control is the conflicted instructions 
from TCAS and the ATCo. For comparison purposes, consider three hypothetical 
configurations:  
• Configuration I:  only ATCo is used to command pilots in collision avoidance. 
• Configuration II: only TCAS is used for collision avoidance control. 





The three configurations are used to control the same collision avoidance process. 
Configuration III has both means of control and therefore the interactions should 
differentiate its control capacity from when only one means of control is used in the 
control process, i.e. in Configurations I and II. The rest of the chapter details of applying 
CBSAF to examine the safety performances with the three different system 
configurations.  
6.2 Stage I: Identify safety critical processes 
At any time, two aircraft under control are either on the collision course, or not on the 
collision course. Since the state that aircraft are not on collision course is safe and does 
not require ATCo to intervene, this state is generalized as 𝑋5.  
In the case where two aircraft are on a collision course, without control, the aircraft will 
travel closer and closer to each other, first violate the separation standards, if not 
detected by ATCo, then the conflict will reach the threshold and activates TCAS to issue 
first a TA and then an RA, and if no control is taken, end in a midair collision.  
Define state space: A characteristic variable in this process is the time to collision. In 
fact, this variable is used in the design and development of TCAS II, denoted as 𝜏.  
As per (DOT, 2011), 𝜏 is defined as: 
 𝜏 = 𝑃𝑆𝑎𝑆𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑆𝑅𝑅
𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑅 𝑃𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑆 (6.1) 
Three critical 𝜏 values, 𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝜏(𝑡𝐴) and 𝜏(𝑇𝐴) are used to define four states: 
𝑋1: 𝜏 ≤ 𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛; No escape maneuver is available to resolve the conflict, not collided yet. 




𝑋3: 𝜏(𝑡𝐴) < 𝜏 ≤ 𝜏(𝑇𝐴); escape maneuver available; TCAS issues TA, but not yet RA. 
𝑋4: 𝜏 > 𝜏(𝑇𝐴); no TA (or RA) is issued by TCAS. 
In addition to the no conflict state 𝑋5, the state space concerning the control of collision 
avoidance between two aircraft is: { 𝑋1,𝑋2,𝑋3,𝑋4,𝑋5} 
Quantitatively, 𝜏(𝑡𝐴) is about 15 ~ 35 seconds and 𝜏(𝑇𝐴) is about 35 ~ 48 seconds, 
depending on the aircraft types, speeds, and headings. In the state space, 𝑋1 is the 
unsafe/accident state, and should always be avoided. States𝑋2,   𝑋3  and 𝑋4  are 
undesirable, since aircraft in these states are on collision course, but not unsafe 
compared to 𝑋1.   
As previously discussed, although choices of states and thus the definition of state space 
are arbitrary, they must conform to the three general principles: 1) Representativeness, 
2) Exclusivity and 3) Exhaustiveness. Additionally, for the purpose of safety assessment, 
the states must be able to represent the safety critical processes in the system’s 
operations. The defined state space for this case is based on and examined by these 
requirements. 
Enumerate for all possible state transitions: The next step of CBSAF is to enumerate all 
possible state transitions among the states. The examination may start with a simple 






Table 6-1 State Transition Permutation Table 
Initial 
State → 𝑋1 → 𝑋2 → 𝑋3 → 𝑋4 → 𝑋5 
𝑋1 --     
𝑋2  --   
** 
𝑋3   --  
 
𝑋4    -- 
 
𝑋5     
-- 
 
The physical constraints will eliminate most transitions e.g. a collision state cannot 
transit to any other states. Manual examination, based on the physical principles yields 
8 possible state transitions: 𝑋2 → 𝑋1, 𝑋3 → 𝑋2,  𝑋4 → 𝑋3, 𝑋5 → 𝑋4,  𝑋2 → 𝑋3 , 𝑋3 → 𝑋4, 
𝑋2 → 𝑋5, 𝑋3 → 𝑋5 and  𝑋4 → 𝑋5. 
Therefore the state transition space is: {𝑋2 → 𝑋1,𝑋3 → 𝑋2,𝑋4 → 𝑋3,𝑋5 → 𝑋4, 𝑋2 →
𝑋3 ,𝑋3 → 𝑋4,𝑋2 → 𝑋5,𝑋3 → 𝑋5 𝑋4 → 𝑋5}.  
Determine the safety critical processes: Safety critical processes by definition constitute 
a subset of the transition space. In general, any state other than 𝑋5 is undesirable. Since 
the scope of problem in question is about collision avoidance, which necessitates the 
states to at least represent aircraft on collision course, only 𝑋1  is considered to be the 
unsafe state in the case study. 
Based on the definition of safety critical process, that without control, will degrade into 
an accident state. Enumerate through all possible state transitions and apply this 
definition. The safety critical process is determined to be 𝑝𝐶𝑔: 𝑋2 → 𝑋5, which is marked 




6.3 Stage II: System control models 
Control Models: The safety critical process, 𝑝𝐶𝑔: 𝑋2 → 𝑋5 , is the control of two aircraft 
from shortly after the RA is issued to when the conflict is resolved. Consider control with 
the three different system configurations. Based on the six basic functions of a feedback 
control loop discussed previously, system control model for the three configurations are 
developed. The individual components and specific communication interactions 
realizing each of the six basic control functions in the baseline model (See Figure 5-7) 
are identified sequentially. The final control models of the three configurations are 





Table 6-2 Three Control Configurations of Collision Avoidance Air Traffic Control 
Configuration System functional Model 
Configuration I: 
With ATCo only 
 
Configuration II: 
Without TCAS only 
 
Configuration III: 






6.4 Stage III: Quantify System Control capacity 
6.4.1 Probabilistic System Control capacity 
Recall PSC definition, for a given system K and process 𝑝 
𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐾, 𝑝) = 𝑃(⋃𝐹𝑖)  or 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐾,𝑝) = 1 − 𝑃(⋂𝐹𝚤�). 
Where, ⋃𝐹𝑖 is symbolic denotation of the event that at least one means of control is 
preserved, and ⋂𝐹𝚤� is symbolic denotation of the event that all means of control are lost. 
First part of the method require control failure/faults to be identified and listed. The 
control models given in Table 6-2 are examined for this purpose. As is shown in Table 6-
3, the identification of fault and failure events start from the six control function to the 
most left. It then refers to the system elements that actualize each of the functions, in 
each control means. The portion of control elements then are used to identify the 
specific faults or failure events. A list of hazardous control hazard events is determined 
as an outcome of this step, which is listed in Column 6 in Table 6-3.  
Also listed are probabilities determined, which are representation of assumed 
performance deviations. For comparison purposes, these probabilities are subjective 
scores chosen by the analyst, reflecting the analyst’s expectation and judgement on the 
likelihood and importance of each performance deviation. The values of the 
probabilities should also be considered assumption on performance deviation. Control 
capacity is defined as the extent to withstand performance deviation. Namely, between 
two control systems and given these performance deviations, determine which one will 




Table 6-3 Hazardous control events and probabilities 










H Radar Fails 0.2 
2 S TCAS fails 0.1 
3 H Radar fails to determine states 0.2 









H FDP fails 0.2 
6 S FDP fails to reflect states 0.2 
7 
ATCo 
H ATCo fails 0.1 




 H TCAS fails to generate resolution 0.1 













S ATCo fails to deliver commands to P1 0.3 
12 S ATCo fails to deliver commands to P2 0.3 
13 S TCAS fails to deliver resolution to P1 0.1 
14 S TCAS fails to deliver resolution to P2 0.1 
15 H P1 fails 0.1 












Compare TCAS resolution with ATCo 
commands: contradict or otherwise 
0.5 
18 
𝑃1 →  𝐴1/ 
𝑃2 →  𝐴2 𝑃1 →  𝐴1/ 𝑃2 →  𝐴2 
H A1 fails 0.1 
19 H A2 fails 0.1 
20.1 S P1 controls A1 following ATCo, given that TCAS contradicts ATCo 
0.5 
21.1 S P2 controls A2 following ATCo, given that TCAS contradicts ATCo 
0.5 
20.2 S P1 controls A1 following ATCo, given that TCAS does not contradict ATCo 
0.5 
21.2 S P2 controls A2 following ATCo, given that TCAS does not contradict ATCo 
0.5 
22 A1/A2 A/A2 S Actuators fail to reach desired states 0.2 
H = Hardware, S = Software, FDP = Flight Data Processor, Gen = Generation, ATCo = Air Traffic 
Controller, A = Aircraft and P = Pilot. 
Also listed in Table 6-3 are the two possible means of control in the collision avoidance 
ATC, types of failure, and assumed probabilities for each event. The results are obtained 




Based on the system’s diagrams from Figure 6-1a), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is then 
used to enumerate for chains of events that lead to the loss of means of control and 
quantify the probabilities of the occurrence of these event chains. The resulting event 
trees for configurations I and II are illustrated in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3.  
ETA systemically enumerates combinations of the outcomes of the hazard events that 
lead to obtaining its control objective. Note in Configuration III, controls from ATC and 
TCAS are analyzed as one process and therefore the interactions between the 
redundant functions during the control process are accounted for.  
 





Figure 6-3 Event tree with Configuration II 
Applying the probability values for each failure event from Table 6-3 to their ETA gives 
the estimated PSC of systems with Configurations I, II, and III to be 0.36 0.84 and 0.55 
(See Table 6-4).  
Table 6-4 Estimated PSC for Configs. I, II and III 
System Config. I Config. II Config. III Change 







6.4.2 Temporal System Control capacity 
6.4.2.1 Time required 𝑡𝑅 
For each cycle of feedback control over 𝑝𝐶𝑔: 𝑋2 → 𝑋3 , the control system will step 
through the six control sub-functions required for the control loop: generation, delivery, 
and execution of control commands, sensing, delivery and interpretation of sensed 
information and TSC is the sum of times used at each step.  
6.4.2.1.1 Means of control I: “Radar-ATC-Pilot-Aircraft” 
Generation: If a conflict is detected, the air traffic controller will responsively take 
action to rectify the situation and resolve the conflict. The generation of control 
commands is determined by experiences of the traffic controller, and complexity of the 
situation, but the time consumption on this step will be bounded. In collision avoidance, 
the situation is best resolved by having one aircraft climb up and the other descend. 
Assuming in this step, the controller only needs to verify if there is any nearby traffic 
invaliding this solution, based on the radar display of the traffic in the controlled region. 
Estimate 1-2 seconds to make such verification, and hence 𝑡𝑔𝐴𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 ∈ (1𝐶, 2𝐶) 
Delivery: Once a decision is made, the control resolution will be communicated to the 
pilot through radio. The time required is the nominal time to pass a maneuver 
instruction from the controller to the pilot, using ATC phraseology. This process includes 
sending of the message and confirmation of the pilot to confirm the pilot’s reception of 
the command by repeating the message back to the controller. Without performance 




Execution: Upon reception of instructions, the pilots are expected to maneuver the 
aircraft as instructed. In the last minute collision avoidance, the standard resolution is to 
have one aircraft climb to a higher altitude and the other descend, e.g. by 1000 feet. A 
typical commercial jet takes about 3-5 second to resolve the altitude conflict. Therefore, 
estimate 𝑡𝐴𝑒𝐴𝐶𝑒𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 ∈ (3𝐶, 5𝐶) 
Sensing and delivery: ATC around the world uses the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon 
System (ATCRBS) to locate and identify aircraft. The components and working principles 
of ATCRBS are illustrated in Figure 6-4.  
 
Figure 6-4 Radar System 
As shown, the time needed for radar to detect aircraft position comprises two parts: 1) 
interrogations and 2) sweep rate. The interrogation is the transmitting and receiving of 
pulses (radio frequency electromagnetic signals). Since electromagnetic signals travel at 
the speed of light, for the range radar system is used in ATC, it only takes between 40 
ms and 100 ms for the signal to travel in most traffic control scenarios. The sweeping 




RDR 2100 takes 3-4 seconds to perform a 90o scan. Based on this information, the total 
time estimated by for sensing and delivery is between 0.1 seconds to 5 seconds. 
Interpretation: The last step is for the controller to confirm that the control has 
effectively resolved  the safety threat. In this case, information of the two involved 
aircraft position, speed, and headings will be displayed on the radar screen. The 
controller will project based these information if the two aircraft are relieved of collision 
threat. For the resolution of altitude change, this should be straightforward, that if radar 
shows that the two aircraft are on different altitudes, the safety control loop will be 
deactivated. Estimate that this interpretation will take 1 to 2 seconds. Hence, 
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑔𝑖𝑔𝐴𝐶𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 ∈ {1𝐶, 2𝐶). 
6.4.2.1.2 Means of control II: “TCAS-pilot-Aircraft” 
The application of TSC definition to the control of TCAS is not as straightforward, 
because the controller in this model is an automated system, rather than a human. The 
same principles apply however, that until the TCAS has detected a threat, the control 
loop will not be activated. Similarly, until the two aircraft’s physical attributes indicate 
no further threat, the TCAS to pilot interaction will be active, i.e. audio advisory will 
continue to be issued.  
TCAS mechanism: One complication in evaluating TSC in this means of control however 
is that the TCAS is one unit that accomplish multiple functions. To examine for the 





Figure 6-5 TCAS mechanism (Kuchar and Drumm, 2007) 
As is shown in Figure 6-5, control functions sensing and delivery are achieved by the 
surveillance transponder unit, which interrogates any “intruder” aircraft in its proximity. 
Information of the surveillance unit is then fed to a unit that extrapolates projected 
trajectories of the “self” aircraft and the “intruder” aircraft for detection of any 
imminent safety threats. Should any threat be detected, the threat resolution unit will 
generate resolution advisories i.e. RA or TA, and announce them to the pilot at 
appropriate times.  
Generation: The resolution advisor is pulled from a template database. Estimate that 
this step takes no more than 0.5 second and as low as 0.1 second. Therefore, 




Delivery: Advisories of TCAS are communicated to the pilots through cockpit audio. The 
delivery completes when pilots accept the advisory and form intent to follow TCAS 
instruction. This process is estimated to be 𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑅𝐴𝑔𝑑 ≈ 2𝐶. 
Execution: Resolution advisories of TCAS to resolve a pending collision has only two 
types: climb or descend. Similar to the case with the other control means, the execution 
of this escape maneuver is estimated at 3-5 seconds. Hence,  𝑡𝐴𝑒𝐴𝐶𝑒𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 ∈ (3𝐶, 5𝐶). 
Sensing, delivery and interpretation: Since these functions are actualized by the 
transponder unit, by TCAS, this process is given a time estimation of 0.1 − 0.5 𝐶𝑅𝑠𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶. 
Thus, (𝑡𝑠𝐴𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑅𝐴𝑔𝑑 + 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑔𝑖𝑔𝐴𝐶𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛) ∈ (0.1𝐶, 0.5𝐶) 
6.4.2.1.3 𝑡𝑅 Summarized 
The above discussion on the time components for evaluation of TSC is summarized in 
Table 6-5.  
Table 6-5 Times needed for each step 
Means of 
control 
ATC to A1 or A2 TCAS to A1 or A2 
Generation Air Traffic Controller 1–2s TCAS: Pull from template 0.1–0.5s 
Delivery Radio Communication  5s Cockpit Audio 2s 
Execution Maneuver of aircraft 3–5s Maneuver of aircraft 3–5s 




Delivery Radar to ground 
Interpretation Flight Data Processor 
to controller 
1–2s 





Therefore, for TCAS, the time needed for completing one iteration is  
𝑡𝐿,𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑇 = 𝑡𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑇,𝑔𝐴𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 + 𝑡𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑖𝐶 + 𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶 & 𝑔𝑖𝑔𝐶𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶 + 𝑡𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑇,𝑂𝑂𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑅𝐴 ∈ (5.2 𝐶, 8 𝐶)  
For ATC, the time needed for completing one iteration is 
𝑡𝐿,𝐴𝑇𝐶 = 𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑛𝐶𝑔𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑔 + 𝑡𝑔𝑔𝐴𝑖𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝐶𝑔𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑛 + 𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶 & 𝑔𝑖𝑔𝐶𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶 + 𝑡𝑔𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑔 + 𝑡𝐴𝑔𝐶𝑔 𝑖𝑔𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑠𝑠𝐶𝑔
∈ (10.1𝐶, 19𝐶) 
6.4.2.2 Time available 𝑡𝐴 
Assume ATCo will be alerted at 5 nm slant range between the two aircraft; and pilot will 
be alerted by ATC or TCAS whichever is earlier. Typical commercial aircraft cruising 
speeds are about 450 kts.  
At the worst case, when two aircraft fly head on towards each other, at the time when 
ATCo is alerted, time available is 
𝑡𝐴(𝐴𝑇𝑃𝐶) = 𝜏 = 𝑃𝑆𝑎𝑆𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑆𝑅 𝑃𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑆 = 5450 + 450 × 3600𝐶 ≈ 20 𝐶 
The state variable selected and the literature on TCAS already gives time to conflict 
information about 𝑋2. As defined 𝑋2 is between the RA is issued and when there is no 
escape. This time as per TCAS II is about 19s to 35s to conflict. The estimated time 
available also falls into the range of time.  
6.4.2.3 TSC 
Given the above estimations on 𝑡𝑅 and 𝑡𝐴, the TSC for all three system configurations 




Table 6-6 Temporal System Control capacity for 𝑋2 → 𝑋5 
 With ATCo only With TCAS only  With Both 
𝑡𝑅 (10.1𝐶, 19𝐶) (5.2 𝐶, 8 𝐶) (5.2𝐶, 19𝐶) 
𝑡𝐴 20𝐶 20𝐶 20𝐶 
TSC (1𝐶, 9.9𝐶) (12𝐶, 14.8𝐶) (1𝐶, 14.8𝐶) 
   
6.5 Result Analysis and Sensitivity Test 
6.5.1 Comparison 
PSC: As shown in Table 6-4, there is a significant difference between the PSC values of 
the control of Process 𝑋2 → 𝑋0  for the systems with Configurations I and II. The 
probability values of events in Table 6-3 are intentionally inflated to augment the 
differences. The probability values are treated as assumptions on performance 
deviation, and scored by analysts as a representation of analyst’s judgements on the 
likelihood and importance of each failure/fault hazard. 
The first observation from the result is that the difference of Configurations I and II, 0.48, 
compared to  that between Configurations II and III 0.29, is much larger. There is an 
indicator that the function of TCAS in increasing control capacity is significant.  
Also noted is a decrease of 34.5% PSC is observed from Configuration II to Configuration 
III.  Since Configuration III has both means of control, and Configuration II has only the 
air traffic controller, this decrease in control capacity suggested the addition of air traffic 
controller means has affected the control effectiveness negatively and by a significant 




a measure to system safety performance. Therefore the conclusion drawn from this 
comparison is that the introduction of ATCo in the collision avoidance process will result 
in a less safe control system. 
The Überlingen mid-air collision accident is the only event where the system with 
Configuration III was by chance the case. The conclusion from this case study is aligned 
with the observation in the Überlingen accident that it is less safe to have both air traffic 
controller and TCAS control a pending collision. 
TSC: The results of TSC evaluations show that there is a higher tolerance to delay for 
Configuration II with TCAS only than Configuration III with ATCo only. The estimate for 
Configuration I shows a minimum of 1 s TSC and for configuration II a minimum of 12 s. 
In ATC systems, delays are frequent and common. For a system with a tolerance of close 
to 0 s indicates highly likely scenarios where there may not be enough time to respond 
to a safety situation. In contrast, TSC estimate for Configuration II indicates a bigger 
temporal protection zone to absorb any delays. Since TCAS was designed and configured 
with temporal criteria and the ATCo is not meant for collision avoidance, such results 
are within expectation.  
The estimates of TSC of Configuration III are based on the worst and best case scenario 
assumptions, taking the union of TSC ranges of Configuration I and Configuration II 
rather than from testing the actual execution of the controls. To acquire estimates that 
account for the interactions between the different control means, alternative 
approaches are recommended such as through experimenting on the concurrent 




Additionally, the time components used for evaluation TSC for the three configurations 
are based on rough estimates. This is due to the demonstration nature of the case study 
and limited resources on experimental and actual data. For more meaningful 
comparisons between the different configurations, estimations of the time components 
are recommended to refer to more reliable sources and references.  
6.5.2 Sensitivity Test on PSC evaluation 
In the evaluation of PSC, probability values of individual hazards are based on 
judgements, which reflect the analysts evaluation of each of the hazard’s likelihood of 
occurrence and importance should its performance deviates. This section is set up to 
test impacts of subjectivity in these judgements, by choosing a wide range of 
probabilities of occurrences for the hazard list and check if the same qualitative 
comparison results will be reached. 
Values used in Table 6-3 are varied in two ways: 1) a percentage uncertainty is attached 
to each probability, and 2) a single sided uncertainty is given to each probability value. 
The new ranges of probability values are given the  
Table 6-7 Tests Details 
Test ID of Hazards. 
applied 
Original P Tested P range Select criteria 
1 ∀𝑖 ∈ [1,22] 𝑃𝑖 𝑃𝑖(1 ∓ 𝛿1%) Uniform distribution 
2 ∀𝑖 ∈ [1,22] 𝑃𝑖 𝑃𝑖 + (0, 𝛿2) Uniform distribution 
 
For Test 1, four 𝛿1% values are used: 10%, 30%, 50% and 90%. For 5000 runs, the ranges 







Figure 6-6 PSC distribution for 𝛿1 = 10  Figure 6-7 PSC distribution for 𝛿1 = 30 
 
Figure 6-8 PSC distribution for  𝛿1 = 50  Figure 6-9 PSC distribution for 𝛿1 = 90 
As can be seen in Figure 6-6 to Figure 6-9, the increase of level of uncertainty increases 
the ranges of PSC each of the configuration can be. However, the uncertainty 
introduced was shown to be insignificant in that it does not change the comparative 
orders of PSC for the three different configurations. For the 5000 combinations of 
slightly different event probabilities at the designated 𝛿1% = 10% uncertainty levels, 
the average remains that: 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐼, 𝑝𝐶𝑔)��������������  ≈  0.38 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼, 𝑝𝐶𝑔)���������������� ≈ 0.84 , and 




Because the values of probability of occurrence selected for each hazard event are 
different in order to represent the relative likelihoods, the absolute variation applied to 
each probability of occurrence is different for each event as well.  
For Test 2, consider if uncertainty intervals are the same for all 𝑃(𝐸). For the cases of 
𝛿2 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 𝑎𝑆𝑆 0.4, distributions of PSC are illustrated in Figure 6-10 to Figure 
6-13.  
 
Figure 6-10 PSC distribution for 𝛿2 = 0.1  Figure 6-11 PSC distribution for 𝛿2 = 0.3 
 
Figure 6-12 PSC distribution for  𝛿2 = 0.2  Figure 6-13 PSC distribution for 𝛿2 = 0.4
As is in Figure 6-10 to Figure 6-13, since the values of occurrence probabilities increase 




as the uncertainty level increases. For the PSC(II) to be smaller than PSC(III), the P values 
need to be above 20%. This sensitivity test provides evidence that the comparison 
conclusions from Section 6.4 hold and are robust to the variations of the judgements on 
the probabilities of occurrence for the elementary hazard events.  
6.6 Summary 
This chapter applies the CBSAF to the study of en route collision avoidance, particularly 
to capture the incoordination between the controller and the TCAS observed in the 
Uberlingen accident. Three system configurations are considered for the safety critical 
process: 𝑋2 → 𝑋5, where 𝑋2 is a precursor state, without control, would degrade to the 
unsafe state 𝑋1, an accident. PSC and TSC are measured based on the control models, 
and compared among three hypothetical configurations. The results indicate that the 
involvement of ATCo over  𝑋2 → 𝑋5  in fact compromises the system’s safety 
performance. This is aligned with observations in the Uberlingen accident.  
This case study also uncovered a number of feasibility to ATC safety assessment 




CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDY II: RUNWAY INCURSION 
7.1 Background and Problem statement 
7.1.1 Background  
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines runway incursion as “any 
occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or 
person on the protected area of a surface designated for landing and takeoff of aircraft”. 
Runway safety has been on the NTSB's annual list of "Most Wanted Improvements" 
since 1990. Yet the number of incursions reported in the U. S. rose from 186 in 1993 to 
431 in 2000, an increase of 132% (Jones, 2002). It is also reported that over 80% of pilot 
caused runway incursions occur during taxi to the departure runway.  
Ground controllers, runway controllers, pilots, stop bars, and automated systems are 
part of the ATC system to control and avoid runway incursion accidents. In the US, two 
automated systems: Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and the 
Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) are used to alert air traffic controllers to 
the potential for a runway incursion. In Europe, similar automation systems termed 
Runway Incursion Alert System (RIAS) are used. The automated systems are designed to 





Being able to understand and assess the safety of runway operations beforehand is 
essential to the assurance and improvement of runway safety. A Multi Agent Dynamic 
Risk Modeling (MA-DRM) based quantitative safety assessment method was developed 
in (Blom et al., 2006, Stroeve et al., 2009, Stroeve et al., 2013), where the runway 
incursion safety assessment for systems with and without RIAS is conducted.  
This chapter compares the CBSAF with the MA-DRM method in the case of the runway 
incursion quantitative safety assessments. Similar setup and terminology as the case 
tested by MA-DRM in (Stoeve et al., 2009) were used for comparison purposes.  
7.1.2 Problem Statement 
Given a scenario of runway incursion as shown in Figure 7-1, the following information is 
considered known prior to the safety assessment. 
1) Two Boeing 747-400 passenger aircraft: Aircraft Flying (AF) and Aircraft Crossing (AC), 
AF Pilots PF, AC Pilots PC, runway controller and infrastructures configured for the 
communication in runway control. See Figure 7-1a).  
2) Aircraft configuration and performance specified by Table 7-1.  
3) Runway configurations which are labeled in Figure 7-1b).  
4) Communications specified by Figure 7-1b). 
The objectives of implementing the CBSAF method is to 1) make quantitative safety 
assessments of systems with and without RIAS installed in runway operations and 
compare safety levels, with and without the stopbar and under two visibility conditions: 
a unrestricted visibility condition, Visibility Condition (VC) 1, and a restricted visibility 




    
a) Scenario Illustration                              b) System diagram (Stroeve et al., 2009) 
Figure 7-1 Runway control 
 
Table 7-1 Specification of Boeing 747-400 aircraft 
Model Boeing 747-400 Takeoff Boeing 747-400 Taxi 
Maximum takeoff weight 875000 lb (396,890 kg)  875000 lb (396,890 
kg)  
Engine Thrust /Engine PW: 63,300 lbf (282kN) 
GE: 62,100 lbf(276 kN) 
PW: 63,300 lbf 
(282kN) 
GE: 62,100 lbf(276 
kN) 
V_1: critical engine 
failure recognition speed 
Flaps 20: 155 kts -- 
V_r: rotate speed Flaps 20: 171 kts -- 
V_2: takeoff safety speed Flaps 20: 180 kts -- 
Takeoff distance 9900 ft -- 
Wing span 64.4 m 64.4 m 
Length 70.6 m 70.6 m 





As shown in Figure 7-1, the safety of runway is monitored by runway controllers, pilots, 
and the automated system all of which are able to generate control commands and 
derive solutions to conflicts when needed.  
For pilots, the only way to detect and dismiss any threats to aircraft safety is continuous 
visual surveillance, that is, by maintaining situational awareness. For air traffic 
controllers, the tower allows visual surveillance of the runway. For the RIAS, if installed, 
can provide two warnings: 1) stop bar violation warning, and 2) pending collision 
warning 15 seconds before the point of collision; and the radar display where 
movements of all aircraft are monitored and measured by radar system, also provides 
information about conflicts of two aircraft, if any. More details on the means of control 
are presented in Section 7.3. The following three sections demonstrate the 
implementation of the proposed CBSAF. 
7.2 Stage I: Identify safety critical processes 
7.2.1 Analysis on runway crossing process 
See Figure 7-2. Define a coordinate system with the origin at the center of the 
intersection, 𝑥 −axis along the take off runway centerline and 𝑦 −axis along the 
crossing runway center line. Denote the positions of AF as (𝑥𝐴𝐹 ,𝑦𝐴𝐹), positions of AC to 






Figure 7-2 Runway Geometry and Coordinates 
The initiating time instance is when either AF or AC starts moving towards the 
intersection. At this point, this moving aircraft (AF or AC) must have permission from the 
runway controller. The other aircraft (AC or AF) should not take off until the first aircraft 
has been cleared off. The process in question is between times when the second aircraft 
initiates takeoff or crossing procedure and when the runway has been cleared off.  
Aircraft Flying (AF): Assume AF uniformly accelerates to takeoff at full power and 
maximum weight, then the acceleration is: 
𝑎𝑚𝑔𝑒
+ = 𝑀𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑔
𝑀𝑔𝑒 𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶 ≈ 2.8 𝑚/𝐶2. 
Where superscript “+” implies acceleration; for deceleration, “–“ superscript will be 
used. Due to the drag as aircraft accelerates, assume that only 90% of the power was 
used for acceleration, hence, 
𝑎𝐴𝐹
+ ≈ 90% × 𝑎𝑚𝑔𝑒+ ≈ 2.5 𝑚/𝐶2. 
From the initiation, it will then take a distance of  𝑃𝑅1to reach 𝑣1, the critical engine 




𝑃𝑅1  = 12𝑎𝑡2 = 12 × 𝑣12𝑎𝐴𝐹+ = 1270𝑚 > 1000𝑚. 
Since this is larger than the distance between crossing runway and take runway starting 
line, it means AF can abort take off any time before reaching crossing runway. In fact, 
position of AF along the runway with respect to time can be estimated with 
𝑥𝐴𝐹 = 12𝑎𝐴𝐹+ 𝑡2 − 1000 
Should AF brakes with 70% of reserved full power at 𝑥𝐴𝐹 = 𝑃𝐴𝐹∗ , after 𝑃𝑂,  
𝑥𝐴𝐹 = 𝑃𝐴𝐹∗ + 𝑣𝑇𝐴𝐴∗ �𝑡 − 𝑡𝑇𝐴𝐴∗ � − 12𝑎𝐴𝐹− �𝑡 − 𝑡𝑇𝐴𝐴∗ �2 
Where, 𝑣𝑇𝐴𝐴∗  is the speed of AF at 𝑃𝐴𝐹
∗ , and 𝑎𝐴𝐹−  is the decelerations at 50% reserved 
power: 
𝑎𝐴𝐹
− = 50%𝑎𝑚𝑔𝑒+ ≈ 1.4 𝑚/𝐶2 
Graphs with different 𝑃𝐴𝐹∗  values for 𝑣-𝑡 and 𝑃-𝑡 are plotted in Figure 7-3. These two 
figures can serve as look up tables for the different cases with different times when the 
imminent threat is detected. 
  




Aircraft Crossing (AC) (Delta Virtual Airlines, 2009): Similarly for AC, assume uniform 
acceleration at 90% of full power, until target taxi speed is met, after which, a constant 
taxi speed, will be maintained. The Delta pilot manual specifies the taxi speeds to be 20-
30 kts for straight line (ICAO, 2007). In this case study 𝑣𝐴𝐶𝑇 = 30 𝑘𝑡𝐶 (15.4 𝑚/𝐶) will be 













Where, the acceleration  
𝑎𝐴𝐶
+ = 90%𝑎𝑚𝑔𝑒+ = 2.5𝑚/𝐶2 
Assume AC could use 80% reserved power to come to a stop, then  
𝑎𝐴𝐶
− = 80%𝑎𝑚𝑔𝑒+ = 2.2 𝑚/𝐶2 
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Figure 7-4 Distance and velocity over time for different braking y 
The kinematics studies are necessary for state definitions. The level of specificity for 
aircraft kinematics analysis was determined by the needs to derive boundary values for 
defining the different states. State definition is the first step of Stage 1 in the theoretic 
method, in this case also needed for TSC calculations. It is also relevant to the PSC 
calculation in that the construction of control models needs information of the 
controlled safety critical process identified in stage 1 and depends on the state 
definitions. 
CBSAF is a top down approach, which decomposes a system from control to the control 
functions to system elements. The lowest level of abstraction when applied to a given 
system is determined by the need to acquire the information required for calculating 
PSC and TSC. In the previous case, the TCAS research provided information about the 
state boundaries, therefore such details of kinematics analysis was not needed. 
7.2.2 Define state space 
Scope of the process to be studied are detailed as follows. First, only the realm of 




will not be considered. Secondly, analysis is limited to AF and AC; possible collisions of 
ground vehicles are not accounted. Thirdly, AF follows nominal takeoff trajectory, and 
AC crossing trajectory, with negligible deviation. These analysis scope statements limit 
the analysis to only the two aircraft and not with nearby traffic or ground obstructions. 
State space: Within the scope of analysis, define the state space of the system. Use the 
projected temporal separation 𝑡𝑇 at the intersection of takeoff and crossing runway as 
the state variable, i.e. the time difference between the time stances AF and AC pass the 
intersections. At any given time, AF and AC are either on collision course ( 𝑡𝑇 ≈ 0), or 
they are not (𝑡𝑇 ≫ 0). In the cases AF and AC are not on collision course, they may 
either be safely separated, or that they are on the courses of near misses. See Figure 7-5.  
  
 
Figure 7-5 System States 
Accounting for uncertainty in controlling the aircraft and the size of the aircraft, 
theoretical near misses, by 𝑡1∗ = 2 seconds for example may in reality likely result in a 
collision accident. Here  𝑡1∗ = 2 seconds, is arbitrary; it may vary case by case, but in 
general a very short time period at the order of seconds. Then, the following states may 
be defined: 
𝑋1: 𝑡𝑇 = 0, AF and AC collide; 




𝑋3: 𝑡1∗ < 𝑡𝑇 < 𝑡2∗, AF and AC on near miss courses; 
𝑋4: 𝑡𝑇 ≥ 𝑡2∗ AF and AC are safely separated. 
𝑡1
∗  is the arbitrary critical value of temporal separation that borders 𝑋2 and 𝑋3 and 𝑡2∗ 
that borders 𝑋3 and 𝑋4. The state space is therefore {𝑋1,𝑋2,𝑋3,𝑋4} 
Under uniform acceleration assumptions and using expected trajectories in Figure 7-3 
and Figure 7-4, 𝑡1∗ is approximately 5 seconds and 𝑡2∗ approximately 34 seconds; both 
values are determined using worst case scenarios. 
  
Figure 7-6 Temporal seperation at intersection 
State transition space: Transverse all possible permutations, and manually check for 
viability of each transition. The acquired state transition space is shown in Table 7-3.  
Table 7-2 State Transition Permutation 
Initial 
State → 𝑋1 → 𝑋2 → 𝑋3 → 𝑋4 
𝑋1 --    
 
 
𝑋2  -- **  
𝑋3 
 
  --  
𝑋4 
 
   -- 
 
𝑋1 is the collision state, and thus a terminating state. Transitions in the first row of Table 




by 34 seconds or more. Transitions from 𝑋4  to 𝑋2  will always first reach 𝑋3 , and 
transition to 𝑋1  will pass 𝑋3  and then 𝑋2  before reach 𝑋1 . Therefore, although the 
transition physically is possible, based on the given state definition, they are not 
considered directly possible. Similarly, from 𝑋3 to 𝑋1, direct transition is not possible, 
since 𝑋2 need to first be reached. For the transition from 𝑋2 to 𝑋4, first 𝑋3 has to be 
reached. The impossible transitions are colored grey in Table 7-2.  
Safety critical process: First, have all possible state transitions listed in the first column 
of Table 7-3. Safety critical processes are controlled transitions which without control 
will directly evolve into an accident. The control-less transition 𝑋2 → 𝑋1 is the transition 
to accident, and with control, 𝑋2 may transit to 𝑋3. Therefore the safety critical process 
is 𝑋2 → 𝑋3, also marked “**” in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-3 State transitions of runway incursion 
State transitions Type 
𝑋2 → 𝑋1 unsafe process 
𝑿𝟐 → 𝑿𝟑 With control; safety critical process 
𝑋3 → 𝑋2 Performance deviation; proceeding unsafe process 
𝑋3 → 𝑋4 With control; critical process 
𝑋4 → 𝑋3 Performance deviation; proceeding unsafe process 
  
Table 7-3 also shows the identified safety critical process: 𝑋2 → 𝑋3, the the transition 
from 𝑋2 (AF and AC on collision course) to 𝑋3 (AF and AC near miss by  𝑡𝑠 ∈ (𝑡1∗, 𝑡2∗).  
Without any control actions, 𝑋2 will evolve into the accident state 𝑋1. 




• Scenario I: Aircraft erroneously in take-off and crossing aircraft on runway 
• Scenario II: Aircraft erroneously crossing and other aircraft in take-off 
• Scenario III: Aircraft taking off and runway unexpectedly occupied; 
• Scenario IV: Aircraft crossing the runway and runway unexpectedly occupied by 
aircraft 
• Scenario V: Aircraft crossing and vehicle on runway; 
• Scenario VI: Collision between aircraft sliding off the runway and aircraft near 
crossing; 
• Scenario VII: Aircraft taking off and vehicle crossing; 
• Scenario VIII: Jet blast from one aircraft to another; and 
• Scenario IX: Conflict between aircraft overrunning/climbing out low and aircraft 
using a nearby taxiway. 
Under the analysis scope of applying CBSAF, Scenarios V, VI, VII, VIII and IX are excluded. 
The scenarios defined with MA-DRM method enumerates violations to standard 
procedures, or hazards in the system that may pose threats to the runway operation 
safety. The completeness of all possible scenarios relies heavily on the analyst’s 
expertise and thus can be arbitrary. The CBSAF assures that the state definitions are 
complete, but it may cover several scenarios where the control options are different. 𝑋3 
the near miss state, for example, can be scenario I AF takes off after AC actively crossing 
the runway, or Scenario II, AC starts crossing before AF has cleared off the runway. The 
resolution for the two scenarios may be different. In Scenario I, since AC has already left 
the stopbar, the stopbar lights could not be used to stop AC. In scenario II, AF is in 
takeoff, AC is still at the stopbar and therefore, the stopbar lights can be turned on to 




On the other hand, the scenarios listed are not necessarily unsafe events. For example, 
in Scenario I, due to the configurations in question, if no control is applied, AC will 
separate AF by at least 11 seconds, and therefore will remain 𝑋3. Similarly, Scenario II 
may be classified as 𝑋2, 𝑋3 or 𝑋4.  
In CBSAF, the choice of state variable is not straightforward. In this case study, instead 
of using 𝑡𝑠 the temporal separation at the intersection, an alternative way is to use the 
two aircraft’s physical position and velocity (whether 𝑣 = 0). The enumeration however 
will be within a large set of possible states and state transitions.  
7.3 Stage II: Control Models 
Recall the guideline of system modeling in Figure 5-7. Use CBSAF to identify the system’s 
control models over different processes. Based on the six control functions and the 
feedback control loop structure, the corresponding hardware, software (interactions, 
procedures etc.) that enable these functions are identified and the control structure 
developed.   
For the identified safety critical transition 𝑝𝐶𝑔: 𝑋2 → 𝑋3 , there may be different 
scenarios based on two configuration differences: 1) whether AC has moved passed the 
stopbar, and 2) whether RIAS is installed in the system. This gives four systems with 
different control mechanims: 1) with stop bar and RIAS, 2) with stop bar and no RIAS, 3) 
without stop bar and with RIAS, and 4) without stop bar or RIAS. The developed control 





Table 7-4 Control Models of 𝑝𝐶𝑔:𝑋2 → 𝑋3 








Means of control: As shown in the control models, there are three decision makers: 
runway controller(s), Pilot Flying (PF), and Pilot crossing (PC). The redundant 
components also yield several means of controls enabled by connections, which are 
listed in Table 7-5.  
As shown in the control models, the three control routes are not independent of each 
other. For example, one means of control is through PC see and avoid, and a second is 
through ATC controlling PC to avert collision. PC is shared between the means of control, 
without which both means will be lost. Although all of them are able to control at least 
one of the safety critical processes above, due to the interdependency, control capacity 




Table 7-5 Means of Control 
Means Sub. Cat. Means of Control 
ATC 
visual 
ATC Visual → R/T → PF → AF 
ATC Visual → R/T → PC → AC 
ATC visual → Stopbar → PC → AC 
visual 
ATC Radar Display → R/T → PF → AF 
ATC Radar Display → R/T → PC → AC 
ATC Radar Display → Stopbar → PC → AC 
RIAS I 
ATC RIAS stop bar violation alert→ R/T → PF → AF 
ATC RIAS stop bar violation alert → R/T → PC → AC 
RIAS II 
ATC RIAS conflict alert → R/T → PF → AF 
ATC RIAS conflict alert → R/T → PC → AC 
`PF Visual PF Visual → R/T → PF → AF 
PC Visual PC Visual → R/T → PC → AC 
 
Visibility conditions: The MA-DRM considers two visibility conditions: 1) unrestricted: 
both pilots and ATCo can visually observe the traffic situation; and 2) visibility range 
between 400 m and 1500 m: ATCo cannot visually monitor traffic and the pilots are not 
always able to see the other aircraft during the first part of the takeoff or crossing. 
Condition 2 indicates foggy weather around runways. In this study, assume with 
Condition 2, controls rely solely on the radar systems, and hence visual surveillance are 
unavailable, even though the given visibility range covers a slight chance where PF and 






Table 7-6 Control Models of 𝑋2 → 𝑋3 for Visibility Condition 2 








As shown in Table 7-6, compared to unrestricted visibility conditions, with restricted 
visibilities, feedback from ATCo visual monitoring is no longer available. Additionally, PF 
and PC are unable to detect conflicts, and act as actuators only. 
7.4 Stage III: Evaluate System Control capacity  
7.4.1  Probabilistic System Control capacity 
Along each possible control loop, the events to achieve the six functions (i.e. sensing, 
delivery and interpretation of process information and generation, delivery and 
execution of control commands) follow a sequential order. Event Tree Analysis is 
therefore suited to obtain permutations for all possible chains of events that lead to 
preservation of at least one means of control, PSC, or loss of all means of control 1-PSC. 
The individual events, or pivotal events, are identified via hazard identification based on 




for event tree construction. The quantification of PSC also requires the probabilities of 
occurrences of each hazard event. As stated in Chapter 4, these values of probabilities 
of occurrence of the hazards are the assumed performance deviations and applied 
across the different control systems for comparison purposes only. The outcome of a 
system’s PSC by itself from this approach is not absolute risk. 
7.4.1.1 Hazard Identification and specification 
Hazard identification is conducted given the controlled process 𝑝𝐶𝑔:𝑋2 → 𝑋3 and its 
control models. Table 7-7 shows the hazard event set identified and used for PSC 
evaluations. For comparison, the hazard list from (Stroeve et al., 2013) on similar 
runway incursion case study is shown in Table 7-8.  
Table 7-7 Hazard list derived by CBSAF 
ID Control Function Type Event Description 
P 
Used 
H1 Sensing S ATCo fails to detect conflict visually 0.5 
H2 Sensing S PC fails to detect conflict visually 0.5 
H3 Sensing S PF fails to detect conflict visually 0.5 
H4 Delivery H Radar system fails 0.01 
H5 Delivery H RIAS fails to warn ATC stop bar violation 0.01 
H6 Delivery H RIAS fails to warn ATC collision at 15s to accident 0.01 
H7 Interpretation S ATCo fails to detect conflict on radar display 0.3 
H8 Generation S ATCo fails to generate solution 0.1 
H9 Delivery H R/T fails 0.01 
H10 Delivery S PC fails to conform to stop bar warning 0.05 
H11 Delivery S ATCo fails to communicate effectively with PC 0.2 
H12 Delivery S ATCo fails to communicate effectively with PF 0.2 
H13 Execution S AC fails to effectively resolve the conflict 0.1 




Table 7-8 Hazard list from (Stroeve et al., 2013) 
ID Control Fun(s) Event Description P min P max 
Q1 Environment No aircraft in take off 0.75 0.75 
Q2 Sensing –exec. Pilots recognize and resolve conflict at early stage 0.5 0.7 
Q3 Sensing Controllers recognize conflict at early stage 0.1 0.2 
Q4 Sensing  Alert System warns controller at early stage 0.95 0.99 
Q5 Ctrl Del.-exec. Communication leads to resolution at early stage 0.8 0.9 
Q6 Sensing – exec.  Pilots recognize and resolve conflict at medium stage 0.9 0.99 
Q7 Sensing –interp.  Controllers recognize conflict at medium stage 0.2 0.4 
Q8 Sensing Alert system warns controller at medium stage 0.9 0.99 
Q9 Ctrl del. – exec.  Communication lead to resolution at medium stage 0.6 0.8 
Q10 Sensing – exec.  Pilot recognize and resolve conflict at late stage 0.9 0.99 
Q11 Sensing – interp.  Controllers recognize conflict at early late stage 0.5 0.75 
Q12 Ctrl del. – exec.  Communication leads to resolution at late stage 0.4 0.6 
 
Comparing Table 7-7 with Table 7-8, the general hazard types are the same: ATCo 
detects conflict, alert system warns ATCo, ATCo command solution through R/T, and 
pilots see and avoid. Discrepancies also exist however. Compared to CBSAF, the list 
given by (Stroeve et al., 2013) contains more combinatory hazards and is less detailed. 
For instance, the counterpart of Q2 in CBSAF may be the combination of H2 and H13.  
Another visible difference is the repetition of early, medium and late stages of the same 
hazards used in MA-DRM. Since the CBSAF assumes only one control action is taken in 
the process to be analyzed, the “late stage”, the earlier and medium stage events of the 




7.4.1.2 Event Tree Analysis  
Use ETA to derive PSC. Figure 7-7 is an example of the event tree developed. Due to the 
oversize of other event tree diagrams, they are not shown.  
 




PSC is the sum of probabilities of the event chains represented by braches that lead to 
preservation of at least one means of control. Repeat the process for the total of 8 
control scenarios. Assuming along the timeline, the events are independent and 
probabilities of occurrence are as shown in the Figure 7-4, the resultant PSC are 
summarized in Table 7-9 and Figure 7-8.  
Table 7-9 𝑃𝑃𝑃 for all 8 control scenarios 




stop bar 0.9074 0.9085 
With stop 




stop bar 0.5690 0.8129 
With stop 








7.4.2 Temporal System Control capacity 
7.4.2.1 Time available 𝑡𝐴 
The safety critical process presumes that without control AF and AC will enter the 
intersection at almost same time (𝑡𝑇 ≈ 0). 
Process 𝑥1 → 𝑥2 requires either aircraft to come to a stop. For this to be possible, The 
latest time for AF to come to a full stop according to Figure 7-3 is if AF initiates the stop 
at 𝑥𝐴𝐹 = −740𝑚. And for AC to be able to stop before the runway, AC needs to act at 
or before 𝑦𝐴𝐶 = −53𝑚. The distance between the two at this point is  
𝑆𝐹𝐶 = �𝑥𝐴𝐹2 + 𝑦𝐴𝐶2 ≈ 731.9𝑚 
Recall Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4, it takes AF about 1 second to cross the intersection, and 
it takes AC about 4 seconds to cross the intersection. This causes AC to start crossing 
about 11 seconds after AF has initiated take off. The control is to interrupt this process 
and stop two aircraft. Ideally both aircraft should be stopped. But if at least one aircraft 
manage to stop, the accident will be averted. 
If the aircraft are on a collision course, at least one aircraft has taken action to stop, 
then 𝑡𝐴 = 17𝐶, all three means of control, i.e. through ATC, through PF and through PC. 
If the visibility is lower than 731.9m, then only ATC can be used.  
7.4.2.2 Time required 𝑡𝑅 
Recall Equation 5.1, and apply the procedure recommended by Figure 5-11. Each time 




Table 7-10 𝑡𝑅 calculation summarized  
Means  ATC to AF or AC PF-AF AC-PC 
Gen. Runway controller 1-2s See and avoid 0.5- 1s See and 
avoid 
0.5 -1s 
Del. T/P to PF 
or PC 





2-5s Maneuver AF 2-5s Maneuver 
AC 
2-5s 
Sen. Visual Radar 0.01–3s Visually 
Confirm 
0.5 -1s Visually 
Confirm 
0.5-1s 
 Del. Radar to 
tower 
Interp. RIAS N/1-3s 
𝑡𝑅 5.01 – N s 3-7s 3-7s 
Note: N is a positive large value. This value is used to account for the possibility that the state is 
detected very early.  
7.4.2.3 TSC  
In the presence of RIAS, the results of TSC for the different system configurations to 
control the safety critical process 𝑥1 → 𝑥2are listed in Figure 7-2.  
Table 7-11 TSC for all Safety Critical Processes 
 
Note: N is a positive large number and N>17s.  
7.5 Result analysis 
7.5.1 Sensitivity Test 
Since the probabilities of occurrence for the element hazard event are used to derive 
PSC of the four system configurations, whether the assumptions on such performance 
  RIAS 𝑡𝐴 𝑡𝑅 TSC 
𝑥1 → 𝑥2 
Y 17s (3, 17)s (0, 14)s 




deviation will affect the comparison qualitatively should be examined. In this section, 
the assumptions on hazard event probabilities are tested. The ranges of probabilities 
used for the events are listed in Table 7-12.  
Table 7-12 Table 7-12 Hazard list and probability ranges in sensitivity tests 
ID Control Function Type Event Description P0 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑚𝑔𝑒 
H1 Sensing S ATCo fails to detect conflict visually 0.4 0.3 0.7 
H2 Sensing S PC fails to detect conflict visually 0.4 0.3 0.7 
H3 Sensing S PF fails to detect conflict visually 0.4 0.3 0.7 
H4 Delivery H Radar system fails 0.01 0.01 0.1 
H5 Delivery H RIAS fails to warn ATC stop bar violation 0.01 0.01 0.1 
H6 Delivery H RIAS fails to warn ATC collision at 15s to accident 0.01 0.01 0.1 
H7 Interpretation S ATCo fails to detect conflict on radar display 0.3 0.1 0.3 
H8 Generation S ATCo fails to generate solution 0.1 0.1 0.3 
H9 Delivery H R/T fails 0.01 0.01 0.1 
H10 Delivery S PC fails to conform to stop bar warning 0.05 0.05 0.1 
H11 Delivery S ATCo fails to communicate effectively with PC 0.2 0.01 0.3 
H12 Delivery S ATCo fails to communicate effectively with PF 0.2 0.01 0.3 
H13 Execution S AC fails to effectively resolve the conflict 0.1 0.01 0.3 
H14 Execution S AF fails to effectively resolve the conflict 0.1 0.01 0.3 
 
For each test, a probability value for each hazard event is taken from the given range 
under uniform distribution assumptions. A total of 5000 random combinations were 
used to find the variations of PSC. The PSC distribution for Visibility Conditions 1 is 




Figure 7-10. The distribution of the differences for with and without RIAS for four groups 
of scenarios are shown in Figure 7-11: 1) VC1 and without stopbar, 2) VC1 and with 
stopbar, 3) VC2 and without stopbar and 4) VC2 and with stopbar. 
 
Figure 7-9 Visibility Condition 1 
 
Figure 7-10 Visibility Condition 2 
 
Figure 7-11 Difference for With and Without RIAS 
As is seen from Figure 7-10, for the range of probabilities selected, the PSC values are 
between 0.55 to 1 with the average of about 0.8 for all four cases: with/without RIAS 
and with/without stopbar. In comparison, for Visibility Condition 2, Figure 7-11 shows 




The difference for with and without RIAS are more clearly illustrated in Figure 7-11, 
where in Visibility Condition 1, the difference is between 0 to 0.04, whereas in visibility 
condition, the difference is between 0.06 to 0.3.  
For the ranges of probabilities of the elementary hazard events assumed in Table 7-12, 
the sensitivity test results therefore support the qualitative comparison results: the 
safety benefits using the PSC measure indicates negligible increase for VC 1 and more 
significant for VC2.  
7.5.2 Comparison with MA-DRM 
PSC: The results obtained by CBSAF indicate that no substantial improvement of control 
capacity is observed with RIAS applied under VC 1 and more significant with VC 2. Under 
VC 1 and for without stopbar, the PSC values for the configurations from without to with 
RIAS has a small increase of 0.1%. In comparison, under VC 1 and for without RIAS, PSC 
of the system from without to with stopbar has an increase of 1.5%, and for with RIAS, 
PSC from without to with stopbar an increase of 1.8%. 
Comparing the different visibility conditions, under VC 1, unrestricted visibility, the 
average increase for the different combinations of performance deviations assumptions, 
the PSC increase is at the order of 0.001. Whereas, under VC 2, restricted visibilities, the 
PSC on average increase by 0.1 to 0.2.  
Since the controlled process 𝑝𝐶𝑔:𝑋2 → 𝑋3 is safety critical, the PSC evaluations are 
expected to correlate to the system’s safety performance. The comparisons indicate 
that under VC 1, the introduction of RIAS does not substantially increase safety, and  




The cases of stopbar as additional quantitative reference indicate that between stopbar 
and RIAS under VC 1, stopbar has a higher influence on the PSC and the safety 
performance. With respect to system design, this is an implication that the addition of 
stopbar in VC 1 is a more effective safety assurance strategy. 
 To interpret the small increase of control capacity, PSC, RIAS is an additional means to 
the many other means of detecting the pending collision. Under VC2, since many 
existing visual means of detection are hindered or disabled due to the reduced visibility 
conditions, the introduction of RIAS becomes more significant. 
The same conclusions are reached in the case study using the MA-DRM method as is 
seen in Figure 7-12, the difference for with and without RIAS is more significant for VC2 
compared to VC1 based on the risk outcomes. The CBSAF in comparison is 
computationally less costly; it also adds a new control interpretation to the outcomes 
from the analysis.  
 




TSC: Since only the CBSAF has temporal measures, TSC is not used in the comparison but 
as additional references. For TSC, if the worst case is considered, that none of the 
human components is aware of the pending collision, then RIAS provides increased 
assurance that the controller has at least 15 seconds to respond. Namely, time available  
𝑡𝐴 ≥ 15𝐶. Comparing time available time required for the system to respond and react, 
TSC has to be greater than 0 to accommodate frequent delays in operations. In VC2, TSC 
is not guaranteed to be greater than 0, which makes the introduction of RIAS necessary 
to assure a positive TSC.  
Considering other means of increasing time available for early detection and in the 
resolving runway incursion threats, the higher the TSC, the safer the system. Therefore 
the TSC is an important references that gives a different aspect on system control 
capacity and safety consideration to the evaluating the safety benefits of introducing 





CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
8.1 Conclusion 
8.1.1 Theoretical foundations  
Based on the view that “system safety is a control problem”, the concept “control 
capacity” can be correlated to a system’s safety performance, through the control of 
safety critical processes. Safety critical processes are processes whose failure to obtain 
its objective will result in safety consequences, e.g. an accident. The control capacity of 
a system in the control of safety critical processes is an indicator of its safety 
performances. This theoretical elicitation is based on the research literature on system 
safety and system control, and used as the foundations to the use of “control capacity” 
as a system safety performance measure.  
8.1.2 Control capacity and metrics 
From a safety perspective, system control capacity is defined as the extent for a system 
to withstand performance deviation in obtaining its control objectives. While control 
systems as well as performance deviations are multi-faceted, this definition is applicable 
to any control systems, and any type of performance deviations.  
In order to quantify the performance deviation and therefore the extent to withstand 




 deviations: 1) failure or faults and 2) delays. This approach is demonstrative for other 
types of performance deviation and may serve as a reference for an integrated 
approach to performance deviation examination. The two metrics to quantify system 
control capacity proposed are “Probabilistic System Control Capacity” and “Temporal 
System Control Capacity”, to address the two types of performance deviation 
respectively. The justification for the selecting the particular two aspects are that in the 
interactions between the controller and the controlled process, PSC has an emphasis on 
the controller side and TSC has one on the controlled process.  
8.1.3 CBSAF 
To adapt the theoretic measure “control capacity” and its metrics PSC and TSC to the 
quantitative safety assessment of the ATC systems, a Control-capacity Based Safety 
Assessment Framework (CBSAF) is needed and assembled. In addition to the two 
metrics, the research elicited a three stage procedural method that consist of principles, 
guidelines and procedures for setting up a QSA for an ATC system: I) identify safety 
critical processes, II) develop control models, and III) evaluate PSC and TSC. The 
procedure is tailored toward QSA of ATC systems, but can be adaptable to QSA of other 
types of safety critical systems, as the principles and guidelines are developed to be as 




8.2 Case studies  
8.2.1.1 Utilities and Potentials of CBSAF 
Two case studies collision avoidance and runway incursion applying CBSAF 
demonstrated utilities and potential of the CBSAF method. In the collision avoidance 
case study, three hypothetical configurations are set up for comparing the effect of 
activating two means of control simultaneously. The configurations are hypothetical 
because they are not the standard procedures where the two means of control are 
regulated to activate at different times and circumstances. Comparing Configuration II 
of air traffic controller only Configuration III with both air traffic controller and the 
automated system TCAS, there was an observed decrease in control capacity. And since 
collision avoidance is a safety critical process, this decrease in control capacity is then an 
indicator that the system’s safety performance is compromised with the addition of air 
traffic controller: from Configuration II to Configuration III.  This is aligned with the 
observation of the Uberlingen Mid-air collision accident. 
Stability of the assumptions on performances deviation in terms of probabilities of 
occurrences of the elementary hazardous events are tested in two sensitivity test, one 
with varying intervals of uncertainty and the other with uniform intervals. The sensitivity 
tests supported the qualitative conclusion drawn from the comparison using the original 
assumed performance deviation assumptions. The comparisons among the three 




reasonable range. The second sensitivity test shows that for a set of unlikely 
combinations of probabilities, the PSC may lead to the opposite conclusions.  
In the second case study on a specific runway incursion scenario, the CBSAF was 
compared to an existing QSA method MA-DRM. The same settings from MA-DRM study 
case are adopted to compare ATC systems with and without RIAS and under 
unrestricted and restricted visibility conditions. Following the CBSAF methodology, the 
results are able to reach similar conclusions as using the MA-DRM with less 
computational costs, that under unrestricted visibility conditions the safety benefit of 
RIAS is negligible and under restricted visibility conditions more observable. Similar to 
Case Study I, the quantity assumptions on the probabilities of occurrence of identified 
failure/faults hazard events are tested for stability. The results show that the 
comparison conclusions hold for a wide range of quantities of the probabilities.  
The CBSAF also provides a new control perspective to the interpretation of this finding. 
In the unrestricted conditions, RIAS is added to existing four means of the observe part 
(sensing/delivery/interpretation), which is first half of the control loop. Therefore the 
impact of the redundant mean of observing is less significant than if it was the one of 
fewer, e.g. only means of observing. Under the restricted visibility condition, the visual 
means of observing are hindered or disabled, which then makes the means of observing 




8.2.1.2 Uncovered issues of CBSAF 
Constricted assumptions: Both PSC and TSC are measured under the assumption that 
only one control cycle is used in the control of a safety critical process. The assumption 
is overly simple to account for situations when one control means is able to attempt for 
a second control cycle when all control means failed in the first control cycle. For 
example, in (Stroeve, 2009), early, medium and late detections were taken into account.  
In the case studies, due to constraints on resources and limited access to data, the 
assumptions to acquire time components of TSC and for definition states require further 
examinations. The TSC results may be treated as demonstrative; they are not 
recommended to use as reference for real systems.  
In PSC evaluations, the assumptions on the probability values lead to restricted 
applicability of CBSAF to comparisons between similar control systems over the same 
safety critical processes. The definition of PSC is extendable to when more accurate 
probabilities are available, e.g. through data, in which case, PSC can be used for 
comparison between significantly different system and for even calibration of target 
levels of safety. 
Limited scalability: First step in Stage 1 of CBSAF starts from selecting state variables. 
Both case studies used 1 temporal variables that result in a small set of states. In other 
cases where the state variables are large in quantities, the possible combinations of 
state variables that characterize the system expand quickly. In other words, the state 





A similar problem exists in the use of event tree analysis. As discussed in Section 5.4, the 
ETA technique was selected for its simplicity and intuitiveness; equivalent quantitative 
risk assessment approaches, e.g. FTA, can be used for this step as well. The scalability 
issue is inherent to ETA. As the number of hazard increases, the ETA size will grow 
rapidly as well. The probabilities if very small, will incur roundabout errors using 
computational tools, e.g. a PC.  
Subjectivity: Safety assessments are intrinsically subjective and rely heavily on experts 
and assumptions about the system. The CBSAF also has a number of subjectivity 
concerns uncovered in the case studies, as are listed: 
1) The definition of states requires arbitrary criteria and is subject to individual 
variations.  
2) The construction of control models requires manual identification of system 
elements and mapping of the elements to the control functions.  
3) The hazard identification relies on levels of expertise and spectra of experiences of 
the analysts and could also have individual variations 
4) The construction of event tree diagram will apply subjective terminating criteria, i.e. 
whether a combination of hazard/failure event outcomes will determined to lead to 
success or failure of control. 
5) The probabilities of hazard outcomes are assumptions determined by the analysts 
and therefore will also contain individual difference, due to the varying levels of 
expertise and experiences with the system. 
These subjectivity issues are common in QSA and use of the ETA technique. Preliminary 
attempts including sensitivity tests are adopted to investigate the impact of the 
subjectivity factors. It is recommended further and more thorough studies be conducted 




8.3 Future work 
8.3.1 Additional Control Capacity Measures 
Control capacity in this research was defined as a tolerance of performance deviations 
in the control of safety critical processes. Performance deviations are of many forms and 
scales. Other than failure, faults and delay, performance deviation may be of other kind 
for example, information integrity through the control loop and lack of coordination. It 
is recommended that the many facets of system control be explored and other control 
capacity measures be proposed and studied. 
8.3.2 Alternative Control Capacity measures 
Control capacity is a general attribute common to all control systems, which is a 
system’s capacity to control. The definition used in this research takes the perspectives 
of safety and performance deviation and measure control capacity by different types of 
performance deviation.  
The more direct approach can take two directions. First, the different performance 
deviations are integrated into one measure. In the STAMP based Process and Analysis 
(STPA), a taxonomy of control faults is given, which covers a range of performance 
deviations. The integrated approach may use this reference to strive for a measure that 
accommodates different types of performance deviations. 
The second direction for directly measure control capacity is to investigate the factors 
that affect a system’s capacity to control. In Section 3.1.1, two illustrative examples are 
given to show that this system control capacity vary with different systems/controllers, 




listed that contribute to the different control capacities including redundancy and 
directness. This second recommended direction can further this effort and explore the 
control capacity measure directly from the contributing factors to the variations of 
system control capacity. 
8.3.3 Automated algorithms 
Another recommended improvement of the method is to introduce automated process 
to the estimation of PSC, which requires construction of large size event trees. Although 
the process is not entirely mechanical and cannot be fully automated, there is a level of 
automation that can speed up the process and reduce errors induced in the manual 
development of event tree diagrams. For example, the permutation of hazard events, 
after being sorted in chronological order, is suited for the capacity of a computer. A user 
interface can be developed to prompt the sequence of events to analysts and request 
for approval. Additionally, some simple rules can be used for repetitive subscenarios, 
with simple rules. For examples, if there is two sensor systems, I and II, for the case 
when system I fail and when system II fail, the rest of the system will have the same 
delivery-interpretation-generation-delivery-execution (sub)scenario and thus the same 
probability of failure.  
Another benefit for accommodating larger size problem is the increased capacity of 
more hazard events. In problems with more complex procedures and components, this 




8.3.4 Complex control models 
Large scale, complex and socio-technical systems often have many levels of control 
structures. The hierarchy and interdependence requires comprehensive and systemic 
examinations. The study of controls of controls may very well be a topic itself. It is may 
be connected to management, when the main components are humans.  
Control is of scientific subject. The science of control is universal and applicable to an 
extremely broad range of processes, systems and even organizations. The generalized 
theories of control mechanism therefore are possible as much as useful. The interested 
readers are encouraged to further explore and formulate general theories of control, in 
the context of general systems and applicable to safety critical socio-technical systems.  
8.3.5 Validation and Verification 
Both case studies in this research are for demonstrative purposes with limited 
verification objectives. The CBSAF framework is subject to thorough and rigorous 
validation and verification processes before it reaches practical and implemental phases. 
For example, the scalability and subjectivity issues discussed in the conclusion session 
needs further study on their impacts. Alternative and more advanced quantitative risk 
assessment techniques can also be adapted and tested in this framework.  
The assumptions used for deriving the CBSAF and for the case studies require further 
examinations, both for their practicalities and whether they can be loosened to 
accommodate expanded use of the CBSAF, e.g. for comparison between system that are 
significantly different and even across domains such as between ground transportation 
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